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ABSTRACT
Network security ensures the consistency, integrity, and reliability of telecommunications
systems. Authorized network access prevents fraudulent communications and maintains the
availability of the systems. However, limited development time, cost reduction pressure and
requirement for high reliability in software development have forced mobile carriers to
implement the insufficient and inflexible authentication mechanisms. Technical specifications
including network architecture, network protocols, and security algorithm are widely available
to the public. In addition, both secured and unsecured networks are interconnected by global
roaming services. The inadequate system design will make the mobile systems vulnerable to
unauthorized access to mobile communications.
Compared with GSM mobile systems, 3G mobile systems are equipped with more
robust and flexible security mechanisms. The official position taken by mobile carriers, such as
NTT DoCoMo, KDDI, and Vodafone, is that fraudulent communications, usually in the form
of cloned mobile phones, are impossible with their 3G mobile systems. Examining the NTT
DoCoMo's case, however, we find that this statement is based on weak security assumptions.
In order to avoid potential threats and to secure the 3G mobile systems, this thesis (1)
explores the security architecture and mechanisms in 3G systems, (2) analyzes the current
platform architecture and platform innovations of the network software, and (3) suggests a
secure system design and development.
Thesis Supervisor: Michael A. Cusumano
Title: Sloan Management Review Professor of Management
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1 Introduction
Network security ensures the consistency, integrity, and reliability of telecommunications
systems. Authorized network access prevents fraudulent communications and maintains the
availability of the systems. Security is an essential part of network communications and has
always been an issue for mobile systems. When first generation analog systems were designed,
little attention was paid to network security [1][2], and insecure systems allowed eavesdropping
in user traffic and mobile phone cloning [3][4]. Calls from cloned mobile phones were charged to
the original subscriber's account. Against fraudulent communications, second generation digital
systems were designed to apply digital ciphering mechanisms. Global System for Mobile
communications, GSM, deployed in 1990, was the first public mobile communication system to
implement integrated cryptographic mechanisms using a smart card or Subscriber Identity
Module (SIM). According to the GSM Association [6], GSM technology is currently used by
more than one-sixth of the world's population. It is estimated that over 1,296 million GSM
subscribers existed across more than 210 countries/areas of the world at the end of December
2004.
Security features implemented in GSM have contributed to preventing fraudulent
communications. However, some of the security mechanisms in GSM already have become
insufficient and outdated. For example, COMP128, one of the main authentication algorithms in
GSM, was broken in 1998 when Ian Goldberg and David Wagner of the University of California
at Berkeley demonstrated a flaw in it [7]. Replay attacks on the security algorithm (called "A8")
demonstrated by Goldberg and Wagner took just 219 queries, roughly 8 hours. This flaw
allowed attackers to make a cloned mobile handset and then make fraudulent calls charged to the
target user's account. Clearly, more advanced security mechanisms will be required for the next
11
generation systems.
Security for the Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) builds on the
success and lessons learned in GSM systems. The basic authentication procedure is similar to
GSM, but UMTS systems focus on mutual authentication between mobile handset and serving
network to avoid fraudulent communications. Security algorithms have become more
sophisticated, and new and longer security parameters have been applied. A new security
message has also been implemented to detect potentially fraudulent communications.
As of January 2005, more than 60 3G/UMTS networks using W-CDMA (Wideband Code
Division Multiple Access) technology are operating commercially in 29 countries (see Figure
1-1). In its initial phase, UMTS offers theoretical bit rates of up to 384 kbps in high-mobility
situations, rising as high as 1.5 Mbps in stationary/nomadic user environments. High Speed
Downlink Packet Access (HSDPA) and High Speed Uplink Packet Access (HSUPA)
technologies are already standard, and HSDPA with around 14Mbps downlink speed will be
released in 2006.
Number of UMTS Networks Worldwide
50
-' 40 
30
1 20 -
10 _._ ......i
2001 2002 Year 2003 2004
Source: Based on the UMTS Forum, 2005, "3G/UMTS Commercial Deployments."
Figure 1-1: Number of UMTS Networks Worldwide (Total as of January 2005)
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Every time subscribers use mobile handsets for such things as call setup, location update,
web browsing, voice/movie message, and short message services, the security functions are
executed. Enhanced security features employed in 3G mobile systems are expected to secure
these true mobile broadband communications.
Previous research has focused on security mechanisms, specific security technologies and
potential security holes ([1][2][3][4][5]), but no research has bridged the gap between security
principals and actual implementation. Examining the NTT DoCoMo's case, this thesis will fill
this gap and suggest a secured system design and development on the basis of platform thinking.
1.1 Operation of the 3G Systems
In order to investigate security issues in 3G mobile systems, Japan is the best example, for
Japan has a longest history in the operation of 3G mobile systems and has implemented the most
advanced 3G systems.
The first mobile carrier worldwide to initiate 3G services was NTT DoCoMo, the largest
mobile communications carrier in Japan with nearly 50 million subscribers (see Figure 1-2).
DoCoMo launched FOMA (Freedom of Mobile multimedia Access) 3G services based on
W-CDMA on October 1, 2001. KDDI, Japan's second largest mobile carrier with 20 million
subscribers, began its 3G services which uses CDMA2000 1X on April 1, 2002. Vodafone,
Japan's third largest mobile telecommunications carrier with almost 15 million subscribers,
initiated its Vodafone Global Standard 3G service, which uses W-CDMA and the latest version of
3GPP (Third Generation Partnership Project) standards, on December 20, 2002. In total, nearly
40 million subscribers enjoy 3G services in Japan (see Figure 1-3).
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Market share of Japanese mobile subscribers (All)
Tu-Ka
., I £1 i3.8%
V in'one
16.8%
KDD
23.4/
DoCoMo
55.9%
DoCoMo KDDI Vodafone Tu-Ka Total
Number of subscribers 49,994,300 20,939,000 14,996,000 3,435,900 89,365,200
arket share 55.9% 23.4% 16.8% 3.8% 100%
Note: Tu-Ka is a subsidiary of the KDDI group.
Source: Telecommunications Carriers Association (TCA).
Figure 1-2: Market Share of Japanese Mobile Subscribers (Total as of October 2005)
Market share of Japanese 3G mobile subscribers
Vodafone
KDDI
50.5%
DoCoMo
44.7%
DoCoMo KDDI Vodafone Total
Number of subscribers 17,584,400 19,849,500 1,894,900 39,328,800
Market share 44.7% 50.5% 4.8% 100%
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Note: Tu-Ka is a subsidiary of the KDDI group.
Source: Telecommunications Carriers Association (TCA).
Figure 1-3: Market Share of Japanese 3G Mobile Subscribers (Total as of October 2005)
In November 2003, a Japanese mobile subscriber filed a suit against her mobile carrier to
be reimbursed for huge packet communication charges that she had not used. The plaintiff was a
junior high school student. She checked her usage logs after receiving huge bills and found that
some calls were made during classroom hours. The plaintiff claimed that cloned mobile phones
had charged huge amounts of communication fees to her account. A non-profit organization
checked plaintiff's mobile phone, and then put it inside a safe for a month, but no fraudulent
communications were found. Mobile carriers including DoCoMo, KDDI and Vodafone made an
official announcement that such fraudulent communications, mainly using cloned mobile phones,
are impossible in 3G mobile systems.
3G mobile systems were not stable in 2003, and billing systems sometimes had software
defects. The junior high school student's huge bill was considered a software defect in the billing
systems. However, the key issue was that all the mobile carriers officially denied the existence of
this type of fraudulent communications, stating categorically that the network access security
mechanism implemented in 3G systems is "perfect." After investigating the case of DoCoMo, I
found that this statement needs to be reconsidered.
1.2 Purpose of This Thesis
This thesis aims to accomplish three goals: (1) explore the security architecture and
mechanisms in 3G systems, (2) analyze the current platform architecture and platform
innovations of the network software, and (3) suggest a secured system design and development.
Telecommunication today is a basic service for individuals and corporations, and security
ensures the integrity, reliability, and consistency of the network. During the connection setup
phase authentication procedure is always executed to provide session keys for confidentiality and
15
integrity protection. Exploring the security mechanisms standardized in 3G systems, we can
identify the strengths and weaknesses of the 3G network architecture.
Under short time-to-market and cost reduction pressure, network software must satisfy
various requirements, such as high reliability, security, compatibility, real-time response and
configurability. Platform architecture and platform thinking are fundamental factors to fulfill
these requirements. Applying the DoCoMo's current platform architecture, I would like to show
the innovation styles of network software. In particular, this thesis focuses on why (1)
architectural innovations are difficult to accomplish, (2) the current platform has resulted in
insufficient implementation and (3) platform renewal is crucial to break through the old
constraints.
DoCoMo's case and interviews with network engineers' in other 3G systems suggest that
huge differences exist between global standards and actual implementation. Even a single
security breach can result in critical and costly failures. Thus, insufficient security features means
more vulnerable against fraudulent communications. Examining the existing network software,
this thesis clarifies the possible security threats and suggests a secured system design and
development.
As of this writing, no cloned mobile handsets have been found in 3G mobile systems.
However, it is crucial to design and develop flexible systems that prevent future fraud before we
encounter unexpected problems. By addressing potential architectural and implementation
problems beforehand, mobile carriers can manage many of tomorrow's security problems.
1. These engineers are involved in Nokia, Ericsson, KDDI and Vodafone.
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1.3 Scope of This Thesis
First, this thesis focuses on developing network software in mobile communications,
especially "core network" software (Figure 1-4). The core network provides switching, routing,
location management, and database functions. All data from handsets is transferred via the core
network. Core networks are slightly different from UMTS (3GPP) and CDMA2000 (3GPP2)
networks, but examining these differences is beyond the scope of this thesis, as is hardware
(infrastructure) and software in handsets.
Second, the analysis herein is based on NTT DoCoMo's 3G mobile systems in Japan, for
the following reasons: (1) DoCoMo is the dominant mobile carrier and its security systems have
major impacts on the 3G networks, (2) the 3G systems in Japan is the most advanced and has the
longest history worldwide and (3) cooperating with other manufacturers, such as NEC, NTT
Comware, and Fujitsu, DoCoMo builds its network software in-house. Other mobile carriers
(KDDI and Vodafone) outsource the network software development. Compared with its
competitors, DoCoMo has considerable knowledge about network software and security issues.
Third, this thesis focuses on network access security. Five security feature groups are
defined in 3GPP specifications: (1) network access security, (2) network domain security, (3)
user domain security, (4) application domain security, and (5) visibility and configurability of
security. Each of these feature groups meets certain threats and accomplishes certain security
objectives. Among the security feature groups network access security, especially user
authentication and network authentication, is directly related with fraudulent communications.
Finally, this thesis applies the underlying platform concepts and innovations in mobile
network software. Meyer and Lehnerd define platform as "a set of subsystems and interfaces that
form a common structure from which a stream of related products can be efficiently developed
and produced" [8]. Therefore, in this thesis "platform" means the core network software that
17
provides fundamental communication services for end users. Due to the limited scope of this
study, operating system and contents-based services (e.g., web application services) are not
included.
1.4 Overview of the Core Network
The core network is divided into two domains: (1) circuit switched (CS) domain and (2)
packet switched (PS) domain. The circuit-switched elements are Mobile services Switching
Center (MSC), Visitor Location Register (VLR), and Gateway MSC (GMSC). Packet switched
elements are Serving GPRS Support Node (SGSN) and Gateway GPRS Support Node (GGSN).
Both CS/PS domains share some network elements such as Home Location Register (HLR) and
Authentication Center (AuC) (see Table 1-1).
Table 1-1: Network Entities in 3G Systems
No. Network Entity Major Functions Note
The VLR/MSC are
MC1 Switching services, controlling calls The VLR/MSC are
Mobility management for the subscribers usually implemented inthe same node.
The VLR/MSC are
2 VLR Temporary subscriber database usually implemented in
the same node.
DoCoMo's network
SGSN integrates the SGSNMobility management for the subscribers integrates the VLR/MSC
Connects to the PSTN4 GMSC Gateway of circuit switching services ISDN
and ISDN
5 GGSN Gateway of packet switching services Connect to the Internet
Management of the subscriber database The HLR/AuC are
6 HLR Location management usually implemented in
Call handling the same node.
The HLR/AuC are
7 AuC Authentication of the subscriber usually implemented in
the same node.
Source: Based on 3GPP
29.002 V6.8.0 [11].
TS 23.002 V6.6.0 [9], 3GPP TS 09.02 V7.9.0 [10] and 3GPP TS
18
Figure 1-4 illustrates the core network. The responsibilities of 3GPP core network are the
followings:
* Mobility management
* Call connection control between user equipment and the core network
* Core network signaling among the core network nodes
* Inter-working functions between the core network and external networks
* Packet-related functions
* Operation and Maintenance (O&M) functions to maintain the network systems [9][10].
19
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Note: 3GPP2 systems also have similar architecture
Source: This network architecture is based on 3GPP TS 23.002 V6.6.0 [9], 3GPP TS 09.02
V7.9.0 [10] and 3GPP TS 29.002 V6.8.0 [11].
Figure 1-4: Core Network in 3G (UMTS) Systems
* Location Management (from handset A): 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 (1, 2, 3', 4', 5', 6', 7, 8)
The main task of location management is to keep track of the subscriber's current
location. When mobile handsets connect to a wireless network, the VLR (SGSN) updates the
20
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location information in the HLR and stores the subscriber data sent by the HLR.
* Authentication (from handset A): 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 (1, 2, 3', 4', 5', 6', 7, 8)
3G mobile networks utilize a challenge-response mechanism to ensure that only
authorized subscribers can access the network. Authentication information is made in the
HLR/AuC and sent back to the VLR (SGSN). The VLR (SGSN) verifies the information and
enables the service.
* Call Handling (circuit switched): 9,10, 5-8, 1-4, 10', 9'
After receiving the message from the GMSC, the HLR searches the subscriber
location in its database (DB) and requires the VLR to provide a roaming number. This
routing information is sent back to the GMSC and the GMSC handles the routing.
* Packet Handling (to handset A): 11, 12, 12', 13, 6', 7, 8
After receiving the message from the GGSN, the HLR searches for the subscriber
location in its database. This information is sent back to the GGSN and the GGSN sends a
confirmation message to the SGSN, which then connects the mobile handset via the RNC.
* Operation and Maintenance (between VLR/MSC (SGSN) and HLR): 4,5 (4', 5')
Several operations are used to maintain consistency between network entities. If the
VLR (SGSN) loses the subscriber data, it requests the latest subscriber information from the
HLR.
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1.5 Thesis Structure
Chapter 1 provides general information about mobile communications and network
security (number of subscribers, market share, general security issues, and network architecture).
Chapter 2 illustrates the network security mechanisms in 3G mobile systems. Focusing on the
network software, Chapter 3 explores the unique characteristics of telecommunication services.
This chapter also describes platform principles and provides a framework upon which to analyze
platform innovation processes in network software. Chapter 4 analyzes the actual network
software to investigate the security mechanism, and examines performance tradeoffs that mobile
carriers face when implementing security features. Building upon Chapter 4, Chapter 5 suggests
how mobile carriers can manage software development to secure their networks. Chapter 5
examines software development strategies that can reduce future threats. Figure 1-5 provides a
graphic illustration of the thesis structure.
In this thesis the major data such as development size, development time, number of
dynamic steps and CPU performance, is based on the actual project information.
Chapter l: Introduction (General Information)
Security Overview Technology aspects
.
Software level
Chapter2: Network Security in 3G Chapter3: Network Software Development
Mobile Systems
Case Study Support Software level
Chapter4: Analysis of the Existing Network Software
Learning
Chapter5, 6: Suggestions and Conclusion
Figure 1-5: Thesis Structure
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2 Network Security in 3G Mobile Systems
Ideally, network security should prevent unauthorized network access and fraudulent
communications. Since the beginning of the first generation systems, there have been discussions
about security solutions. The central questions are: how is security defined; how should security
architecture be designed; and how should security mechanisms work. As a first step to analyzing
the security mechanisms in 3G mobile systems, it is essential to explore fundamental principles
of security.
2.1 Security Principles
The fundamental principles of security have remained unchanged since the OECD
proposed essential guidelines for security in 1992, which suggested, "the objective of security of
information systems is the protection of the interests of those relying on information systems
from harm resulting from failures of availability, confidentiality, and integrity [12]." Availability,
confidentiality, and integrity comprise the three key security principles of information systems.
In other words, a breach of any one of the three principles can have serious consequences for a
system. 3G mobile systems define similar security features based on these OECD principles.2
Although OECD's concepts have already become classic and traditional [13], network systems
continue to follow this simple but strong security model.
2. ISO [24] also defines security as follows: "The capability of the software product to
protect information and data so that unauthorized persons or systems cannot read or modify them
and authorized persons or systems are not denied access to them."
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1) Availability
The characteristic of data, information, and information systems being accessible and usable
on a timely basis in the required manner
2) Confidentiality
The characteristic of data and information being disclosed only to authorized persons, entities,
and processes at authorized times and in the authorized manner
3) Integrity
The characteristic of data and information being accurate and complete and the preservation
of accuracy and completeness
2.2 3G Security Features
The first generation analog mobile systems had few security features to protect the systems
and the users. The second generation digital systems incorporated improved security features and
contained entity authentication and confidentiality protection. However, it has now been fifteen
years since the first GSM system was deployed. Security features have become obsolete and
need to be updated to prevent existing and potential security threats. With the advent of 3G
mobile systems, a serious effort is underway to create a consistent security architecture based on
the threats and risks that 3G systems face [5].
The Universal Mobile Telecommunications system (UMTS) is the newest evolution of the
Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM). Therefore, the security of UMTS systems is
built on security from GSM, making use of proven GSM security features. UMTS aims to
24
maintain the robustness of existing GSM security features, enhance the existing security
mechanisms, and correct perceived weaknesses in 2G systems (see Table 2-1).
Table 2-1: Comparison of 3G (UMTS) and 2G (GSM) Security
3G Network Security GSM Network Security
Authentication Mutual authentication between a Unilateral authentication of user to
Procedure mobile handset and network network
Scope Network to network, RNC Mainly among base stations
Data Integrity Explicit Implicit
Key Length 128 bits 32 bits-64bits
Algorithm KASUMI, MAC, MILENAGE COMP 128 (already broken)
Design method Open design Closed design
Key Parameters Mechanisms to secure key parameters No mechanisms to secure cipher keys
Transmission within and between networks and authentication values
Upgrading Flexible Inflexible
Fraud Detection Explicit mechanisms Implicit mechanisms
Source: Based on Howard, M Walker, T Wright, 2001 [14].
3GPP categorizes possible security threats to 3G systems: (1) unauthorized access to
sensitive data (violation of confidentiality), (2) unauthorized manipulation of sensitive data
(violation of integrity), (3) disturbing or misusing network services (leading to denial of service
or reduced availability), (4) repudiation, and (5) unauthorized access to services. Fraudulent
communications mainly result from "unauthorized access to services," but intruders 3
masquerading as users or network entities have the potential to trigger other threats.
2.3 Security Architecture
The UMTS network can be observed from physical entities and logical (protocol-related)
3. 3GPP defines intruders as follows: a party who attempts to breach the confidentiality,
integrity, or availability of 3G, or who otherwise attempts to abuse 3G in order to compromise
services or defraud users, home environments, serving networks, or any other party. An intruder
may, for example, attempt to eavesdrop on user traffic, signaling data and/or control data, or
attempt to masquerade as a legitimate party in the use, provision, or management of 3G services.
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aspects. Physical entities are modeled using the domain concept4 and logical aspects are
modeled using the stratum concept.5 Each domain has its own functions and protocol interface
(see Figure 2-1). Communication data is transferred between these domains and security features
are defined to protect the data against attacks.
pJCi LLpl A..UYlI%,.LL UJ.JLiULII IlIfaSLTutlLU iJUIlIUIIIl
Source: Based on 3GPP TS 33.102 V.6.3.0 [15].
Figure 2-1: UMTS Domains
Five security feature groups are defined in UMTS and each of these feature groups meets
certain threats and accomplishes certain security objectives [15]. An overview of the complete
3G security architecture is shown in Figure 2-2. Network access security ensures the user identity,
user/network authentication, confidentiality, data integrity, and mobile equipment identification.
4. Domain: The highest-level group of physical entities.
5. Stratum: Grouping of protocols related to one aspect of the services provided by one or
several domains.
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This thesis will focus on network access security between Universal Subscriber Identity Module
(USIM), Serving Network (SN), and Home Environment (HE).6
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Source: 3GPP TS 33.102 V6.3.0 [15], p. 11, Figure 1.
Figure 2-2: Overview of the UMTS Security Architecture
1) Network access security (I)
The set of security features that provide users with secure access to 3G services, and which
protect against attacks on the (radio) access link.
2) Network domain security (II)
The set of security features that enable nodes in the provider domain to securely exchange
signaling data, and protect against attacks on the wire line network
6. To simplify the discussion, we can consider that USIM is a mobile handset, SN is
VLR/SGSN, and HE is HLR/AuC.
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3) User domain security (III)
The set of security features that secure access to mobile stations
4) Application domain security (IV)
The set of security features that enable applications in the user and provider domains to
securely exchange messages
5) Visibility and configurability of security (V)
The set of features that enables the user to inform himself whether or not a security feature is
in operation, and whether the use and provision of services should depend on the security
feature
2.4 Network Access Security Mechanisms
2.4.1 Authentication Procedure
The general procedure for authentication between a mobile handset and the network is
illustrated in Figure 2-3. This security mechanism is designed to achieve mutual authentication
between the mobile user (handset) and the network by showing knowledge of a pre-shared secret
key7 "K" (128 bits) shared in the USIM and the AuC. This two-way authentication procedure
allows UMTS to increase network security compared with GSM by eliminating false base station
problems. 8
K is not transferred in the network between the mobile handset to HLR/AuC, but it is
possible to attack the USIM in the mobile handset (especially when retailers register the
subscriber information). If K is exposed to intruders, cloned mobile phones become quite
possible.
7. Definitions of these security parameters are given in Table 2-2.
8. In GSM mobile handsets cannot reject the false base stations, which can unscramble
mobile phone calls.
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The authentication data contains sensitive information, such as cryptographic keys and
random challenge-response codes. Thus, the transfer of authentication data between the
HLR/AuC and the VLR/SGSN needs to be secured against eavesdropping and modification.9
Authentication Request (No. 1-4 in Figure 2-3)
The basic authentication procedure is carried out between the user equipment (USIM, MS)
and the core network (VLR/SGSN and HLR/AuC). User-oriented transactions, such as call setup
and location update, initiate the authentication procedure. Authentication data request (operation
name: Send Authentication Info) is sent from VLR/SGSN ° to HLR/AuC and AuC generates
authentication vectors (AV). At the same time AuC increases the SQNHE and stores the value in
its database. l l
Authentication Response (No. 5-8 in Figure 2-3)
The AV consists of five vectors: a random number (RAND), an expected user response
(XRES), a cipher key (CK), an integrity key (IK), and an authentication token for network
authentication (AUTN). After receiving these authentication vectors, VLR/SGSN sends two
vectors (RAND and AUTN) to the mobile handset and verifies the response from the handset.
9. In order to protect against fraud, MAPsec (Mobile Application Part security) has been
developed by 3GPP
10. If the call setup is made in the circuit domain, VLR sends the authentication request
(Send Authentication Info) to HLR. If the call setup is made in the packet domain, SGSN sends
the authentication request (Send Authentication Info) to HLR.
11. This procedure is not implemented in the DoCoMo's 3G systems.
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Verification and Failure Report (No. 9-12 in Figure 2-3)
The mobile handset also checks the MAC' 2 and SQN in AUTN to verify the network. If
authentication fails in the mobile handset, the error message (Authentication Failure Report) is
generated and sent to HLR/AuC. This message is used to analyze fraudulent communications.
Re-synchronization (No. 13-20 in Figure 2-3)
If the mobile handset fails to verify 13 the SQN sent from HLR/AuC, a re-synchronization
procedure'4 is initiated to match the counter between SQNHE and SQNMs. HLR/AuC checks the
SQN and MAC in the AUTS and resets the SQNHE value to SQNMs. After re-synchronization,
HLR/AuC sends "Send Authentication Info ack" 15to VLR/SGSN, which completes the
re-synchronization procedure.
Network Authentication (No. 21-28 in Figure 2-3)
After checking MAC and SQN, the mobile handset computes RES and sends the result to
VLR/SGSN, which also compares the RES with the XRES received from the HLR/AuC and
finishes the network authentication. If RES differs from XRES, VLR/SGSN sends
"Authentication Failure Report" showing the cause of failure. If RES is equal to XRES,
VLR/SGSN selects the CK and IK for connection setup. The mobile handset also computes CK
and IK and stores the SQN.
12. Given the real time constraints, 3GPP relies on conventional methods based on MAC.
13. Unlike MAC failure, SQN failure is basically considered as lost synchronization not as
an authentication error.
14. This procedure is not implemented in DoCoMo's 3G systems.
15. "Ack" means "acknowledgement" and shows the response of the message.
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Table 2-2: Definitions of Security Parameters in 3G Systems
Source: Based on 3GPP TS 29.002 V6.8.0 [11], 33.102 V6.3.0 [15].
16. Other use, such as changing sequence number verification parameters, is also possible.
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Stand for Purpose From/To Message
Encrypt the
K Encryption key authentication (Only stored in the (Only stored in the HLR/AuC
parameters HLR/AuC and USIM) and USIM)
Random number to
scramble the HLR/AuC to VLR/SGSN Send Authentication Info
authentication VLR/SGSN to MS User Authentication Request
message
XRES Expected response Authentication of the HLR/AuC to VLR/SGSN Send Authentication Info
mobile handset
Cipher the dataCK Cipher Key Cipher the data HLR/AuC to VLR/SGSN Send Authentication Info(confidentiality)
IK Integrity Key Protect the integrity HLR/AuC to VLR/SGSN Send Authentication Info
of the control data
AUTN Authentication Authentication of the HLR/AuC to VLR/SGSN Send Authentication InfoToken network
Protect against HLR/AuC to VLR/SGSN Send Authentication Info
SQN Sequence number replay attacks MS to HLR/AuC Synchronization Failure
Conceal the HLR/AuC to VLR/SGSN Send Authentication Info
AK Anonymty Key seque ce number MS to HLR/AuC Synchronization Failure
Authentication Support multiple
AMF Authenbca ld authentication HLR/AuC to VLR/SGSN Send Authentication Info
management field algorithms 16
Ensure the
authenticity and
MAC The message integrity of the HLR/AuC to VLR/SGSN Send Authentication Info
authentication code authentication token MS to HLR/AuC Synchronization Failure
and the random
challenge
Authentication Re-synchronization HLR/AuC to VLR/SGSN Send Authentication Info
AUTS Token for Authentication of theAUTS Token for Authentication of the MS to HLR/AuC Synchronization FailureRe-synchronization network
MS 
HLR/AuC
I VLR/SGSN I
1. Network Access 2. Send Authentication Info
[IMSI, Number of Requested Vectors]
3. Generate
authentication vectors
5. Send Authentication Info ack
4. Store SQN
'[IMSI, RAND, XRES, CK, IK, AUTN)*5]
6. Store authentication vectors I
.I._._ [R
I -eckM R
NG
OKc _
NG
I t
10. Us
1 7. Select authentication vector AV(i) I
8. User Authentication Request
AND(i), AUTN(i)]
Der Authentication Reject
[CAUSE]
L- . [ OUIlTllO llzatLlllo rall 
[AUTS]
I - 1 I
I z . Uoma ute K er 
22. User Authentication Response 
[RES(i)]
11. Authentication Failure Report
[IMSI, Failure Cause]
12. Authentication Failure Report ack
15. Send Authentication Info
[IMSI, (RAND(i), AUTS)]
f'T
20. Send Authentication Info ack
.Ch~
OK
18. Reset SQN
SQNHE = SQNMs
19. Generate
authentication vectors
J[IMSI, (RAND, XRES, CK, IK, AUTN)*5]
L
1 27. Compute CK, IK I
28. Store SQN
24. Authentication Failure Report
NG | . ..[IMSI, Failure Cause]
25. Authentication Failure Report ack
1 26. Select CK(i), IK(i)
Source: Based on 3GPP TS 33.102 V6.3.0 [15].
Figure 2-3: Authentication Mechanisms (Key Agreement)
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2.4.2 Verification of Sequence Number (SQN) against Replay Attacks
Replay attacks-attacks on the system where messages have been intercepted and then
retransmitted (replayed) later-are fierce attacking mechanism that results in masquerading. To
overcome this threat, 3GPP technical specifications describe the use of a Sequence Number
(SQN). An SQN is the counter (48 bits) possessed by both USIM and AuC to ensure network
authentication. The sequence number, SQNHE, is an individual counter for each user stored in
HLR/AuC, and the sequence number SQNMs denotes the highest sequence number that the
USIM has accepted. In the authentication process, the USIM and the HLR/AuC keep track of
counters SQNMs and SQNHE, respectively, and compare the SQNs (SQNHE - SQNMS<A7 and
SQNHE >SQNMs). If the received SQN is out of range, a re-synchronization procedure will be
initiated to match the counter between SQNHE and SQNMs.
Verification of SQN is one of the essential mechanisms to maintaining network access
security. The occurrence of a re-synchronization procedure is treated as lost synchronization and
not as an authentication error, but it suggests possible fraudulent access.
Only the true USIM and HLR/AuC know the right SQN. SQN always changes with user
transactions, and it is almost impossible for intruders to copy the SQN in real-time transactions.
Any arbitrary jumps in sequence numbers can mean possible fraudulent access (see Figure 2-4).
17. Mobile carriers can choose the appropriate value of A. However, it is recommended
that the value of A uses 228 in the 3GPP TS 33.102 (Annex C) [15].
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Source: Author, 2005.
Figure 2-4: Verification of the SQN
The management of SQN is challenging for mobile carriers. Both the time-based and
non-time-based SQN generation functions require complex software development. In terms of
systems operation, operational difficulty exists in SQN management [16]. HLR/AuC has to store
the latest SQNs for each subscriber and implement real-time backup functions for SQN. A crash
in the database systems causes tremendous amount of re-synchronization procedures in the
network, which results in severe network congestion.
In addition, mobile carriers have to execute the re-synchronization procedure when the
USIM detects that the sequence number is not in the correct range. The re-synchronization
procedure should not occur too frequently for performance reasons. Verification of the freshness
of the sequence number helps mobile carriers detect potential fraud. However, it is costly and
takes time to implement and manage this function. In fact, DoCoMo simplified this mechanism
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in order to reduce software complexity, development time, and development costs.
2.4.3 Generation of Authentication Vectors
The generation of authentication vectors promises the central authentication functions to
secure the system. The HLR/AuC starts by generating a fresh SQN as well as an unpredictable
challenge RAND (see Figure 2-5). Deriving K from the subscriber database and applying SQN,
AMF, and RAND to the cryptographic functions (f-f5), the HLR/AuC generates MAC, XRES,
CK, IK, and AK. AUTN is also created from SQN, AK, AMF, and MAC. Consequently, an
authentication vector (AV) with RAND, XRES, CK, IK, and AUTN is produced in the HLR/AuC.
The HLR/AuC repeats this procedure up to five times per authentication request.
I Generate SQN
I -n DAT I
RAND
K
MAC XRES CK IK
AUTN := SQN ED AK II AMF II MAC
AV := RAND II XRES II CK II IK I AUTN
Source: 3GPP TS 33.102 V6.3.0 [15], p. 20, Figure 7.
Figure 2-5: Generation of the Authentication Vectors (AuC)
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After receiving the authentication vectors from HLR/AuC, the USIM in the mobile
handset checks the received value (see Figure 2-6). Applying the K in the USIM and extracting
the RAND and AUTN, the USIM calculates the XMAC, RES, CK, and IK. In the mobile handset,
the USIM verifies the MAC and the range of the SQN. The cryptographic functions (f-f5*) are
used in this Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) procedure and these functions are
exclusively implemented in the USIM and AuC (see Table 2-3).
Source: 3GPP TS 33.102 V6.3.0 [15], p. 22, Figure 9.
Figure 2-6: User Authentication Function (USIM)
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RAND AUTN
K
XMAC RES CK
I Verify MAC = XMAC I
I Verify that SQN is in the correct range 
·
IK
Table 2-3: Cryptographic Functions in UMTS
Algorithm Purpose/Usage 0: Operator Specifc LocationS: Fully Standardized
f0 Random challenge generating function O AuC
fl Network authentication function O - (MILENAGE) USIM and AuC
fl * Re-synchronization message O - (MILENAGE) USIM and AuC
authentication function
f2 |User challenge-response authentication 0 (MILEN
function
f4 Cipher key derivation function O - (MILENAGE) USIM and AuC
f4 Integrity key derivation function O - (MILENAGE) USIM and AuC
Anonymity key derivation function for
normal operation
f5* Anonymity key derivation function for O - (MILENAGE) USIM
re-synchronization
f6 MAP encryption algorithm S MAP nodes
f7 MAP integrity algorithm S MAP nodes
f8 UMTS encryption algorithm S - (KASUMI) MS and RNC
f9 UMTS integrity algorithm S - (KASUMI) MS and RNC
Note: MILENAGE and KASUMI are names of security algorithms
Source: Koien, G. M, 2004 [5], p. 10, Table 1.
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2.5 Security Issues about 3G Mobile Networks
Securing mobile systems sufficiently remains a challenging issue because (1) for
performance reasons, 3G mobile systems have to rely on conventional security methods, (2) both
secured and unsecured networks are interconnected by global roaming services and (3) it is still
difficult to upgrade security features to protect against brand-new and unexpected network
attacks.
Security mechanisms must perform within short setup time (practically maximum: 15 sec).
In order to avoid setup delays, the 3GPP security working group decided to rely on conventional
security methods based on MAC functions, which were already in use in GSM and GPRS
networks [5]. Applying the conventional challenge response mechanisms instead of using latest
security technologies, 3G security has succeeded to reduce the network delays, but this
procedure also makes the system less secure.
Backward compatibility also can result in a security hole in 3G networks. Secured and
unsecured networks are connected via several services. Unauthorized network access can occur
via other networks that support weaker security mechanisms. While data integrity is mandatory
in 3G networks, data encryption is not mandatory in the systems. For example, China is one
prominent example of a country that does not use encryption in mobile handsets. Some other
countries may also turn off encryption due to export restriction reasons. The Wassenaar
agreement allows export of handsets with 128-bit encryption, but other network facilities (e.g.,
RNC) will be subject to Wassenaar restrictions [17]. Although backward compatibility between
different carriers is not mandatory, commercial demands for new services, such as global
roaming, force mobile carriers to implement this feature.
3G security builds on the success and lessons learned in GSM systems. Therefore, the
scope is limited to well-known security issues. In order to enhance security features and deal
38
with future security threats, 3G security is designed to expand security features. Practically,
however, it is very challenging to improve security features. Alternating the security functions
requires architectural changes' 8 in both the mobile handsets (embedded in IC chips) and the
HLR/AuC. Compared with GSM, 3G has more flexibility, but upgrading network software and
renewing USIM cards (over 17 million cards) are not an easy task.
Furthermore, the 3G technical specifications, including network architecture, network
protocols, and security algorithms, are widely available to the public. 3GPP also provides sample
source codes and simulation data for security algorithms. On the basis of the Kerckhoffs's law
[18], open-design architecture helps create better security standards, but at the same time it may
help intruders find security holes in the system. Potential intruders also have the opportunity to
investigate the software closely to identify its vulnerabilities. Given that most of the network
attacks are based on software flaws and design errors, an inadequate system design will make the
mobile systems vulnerable to unauthorized access to mobile communications.
18. Sometimes platform extension is applied and sometimes platform renewal is crucial.
We will discuss this topic in Chapter 3.2.
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3 Network Software Development
3.1 Requirements for Network Software
Software Engineering: The establishment and use of sound engineering principles (methods) in
order to obtain economically software that is reliable and works on real machines (Bauer, 1972
[19]).
Software Engineering: The practical application of scientific knowledge in the design and
construction of computer programs and the associated documentation required to develop,
operate, and maintain them (Boehm, 1976 [20]).
Software engineering is the technological and managerial discipline concerned with systematic
production and maintenance of software products that are developed and modified on time and
within cost estimates (Fairley, 1985 [21]).
Software engineering is more than just writing and debugging code. As Boehm, Bauer, and
Fairley state, the fundamental principles of software engineering include quality, cost
(economics), delivery, and the application of knowledge and discipline. These definitions
indicate that software engineering should create high-quality software in a systematic, controlled,
and efficient manner. Under the quality models identified in IS09126 and ISO9126-1 (see Figure
3-1), network software19 development strongly requires such fundamental principles.
ISO's quality attributes are global standards that allow us to comprehensively evaluate
software quality. The comparison of network software with other application software suggests
that network software differs in the areas of functionality, reliability, efficiency and
maintainability (see Figure 3-2). In particular, requirements for reliability, such as maturity
(perfection = zero defects) and availability, distinguish network software from other application
software [22][23]. Network software must guarantee the critical functions of telecommunications
19. Network software means telecommunications software, but network software provides
not only telecommunications but also more sophisticated and value-added communication
services. Security features work on network software to protect against attacks.
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systems. Thus, reliability is one of the most essential requirements in network software. On the
other hand, usability, such as understandability and attractiveness, is considered less important
than other quality attributes because network software is designed to satisfy specific needs of
telecommunications carriers rather than end users.
Source: ISO/IEC, 9126-1, 2001 [24], p. 7, Figure 4.
Figure 3-1: Quality Model for External and Internal Quality
Functionality
availability)
ability,
s)
n software I
Efficiency
(Time behavior, resource management) Network software
Note: technical terms in use are based on ISO9126-1 [24]
Source: Author, 2005.
Figure 3-2: Comparison in Quality (Application Software and Network Software)
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On the basis of the existing ISO standards, we shall now take a closer look at specific
quality attributes that required in network software development.
3.1.1 Reliability (Maturity and Availability)
Every industry in the world depends on some form of telecommunications. Along with
energy, financial services, transportation, and vital human services, telecommunications systems
are part of the nation's critical infrastructure. Each critical infrastructure is increasingly
interdependent on other complex systems. In addition, telecommunications infrastructure itself
forms a complex interconnected networked system that stretches over a large geographical area
to reach every household and economic entity in a region. Failure of the network software (e.g., a
local disturbance in one system) causes large-scale failure via cascading events that can have
unexpected and catastrophic consequences. For example, emergency services, such as calls to
police, ambulance, and firefighters, also depend on telecommunications systems. If the telephone
network goes down, even for a short time, most businesses and individuals could experience
severe consequences.
Telecommunications systems must be significantly robust [25]. In theory, a switching
system should be available for all but two hours within a 40-year period [26]. Today,
telecommunications systems are required to support up to 5 or 6 nines (or 99.999 to 99.9999%)
reliability, which translates to between 30 seconds (6 nines) and 5 minutes (5 nines) of downtime
per year [27].
However, maintaining the high reliability is a quite challenging issue in network software
development. Telecommunications systems are subject to hidden failures-hardware or software
failures that only become apparent when a system or some portion of a system is highly stressed
due to congestion or fault. In other words, hidden failures are typically not revealed before the
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system is perturbed. Furthermore, in every transaction, received messages, subscriber
information and execution timing vary in the same environment. Thus, it is quite difficult to
examine and fix the software failures in operation [28].
New features also increase behavioral complexity [29] and might destroy existing
functions (called feature interaction problems [30][31][32]) in telecommunications systems.
Thus, new features are carefully designed and tested for "unfailing reliability" before upgrades
are implemented. Early detection of failures, flexibility in the architecture (easy upgrading), and
redundancy (fault tolerance system) are keys to minimize the serious effects of hidden failures
and achieve unfailing reliability.
3.1.2 Security
In every transaction, network software manages sensitive subscriber data including
telephone number (MSISDN), identification number (IMSI), time, and location information.
Thus, network software should be designed to protect against unauthorized network access,
manipulation of data, and repudiation of services. Advanced mathematical algorithms, such as
cryptographic functions (f0-f5 in Table 2-3), are applied to ensure the authorized users and
prevent interception. These security features make fraudulent communications impossible, and
communication messages traveling across networks cannot be obtained or read by anyone other
than the authorized users.
In addition to this direct authentication mechanism, network software should facilitate a
threat/risk analysis, which identifies imminent and potential risks in 3G systems. Specific threats,
such as fraudulent network access and masquerading as another user, are analyzed to eliminate as
much as possible threats to the network. Protocol analysis functions help investigate questionable
message flows. For example, if HLR receives a number of "Authentication Failure Report"
43
messages (failure messages in user authentication) from VLR/SGSN, it is an indication of
unauthorized accesses to the network.
The accumulated experiences of mobile carriers using first generation (analog) systems
and second generation (especially GSM or PDC) systems also help to understand current and
future threats to mobile systems. For the threat analysis network software must implement strong
risk assessment functions (traffic analysis, data trace, and protocol analysis) to help operators
identify fraudulent communications.
3.1.3 Compatibility (Interoperability)
Telecommunications carriers have to maintain compatibility2 0 in four ways: (1) between
generations in the same carrier, (2) in the same generation in the same carrier, (3) between
generations in different carriers, and (4) in the same generation among different carriers (see
Figure 3-3).
Different
generation
Same
generation
Same carrier
Support several protocols to maintain
the previous fiunctions (1)
E.g., PDC and UMTS
E.g., PDC and cdmaOne
E.g., PDC and CDMA2000
Support the same protocols and
improve functions/services (2)
E.g., PDC + new services
E.g., UMTS + new services
E.g., CDMA2000 + new services
Different carriers
upport seveal protocols-t:
keep and expand mobtiity (3)
E.g., GSM and UMTSl
E.g.,. cdmaOne and CD A2000
Support the same protocols to
keep and expand mobility (4)
E.g., UMTS-UMTS
E.g., CDMA2000- CDMA2000
Source: Author, 2005.
Figure 3-3: Compatibility in Telecommunications Systems
20. In this thesis compatibility means "interoperability."
44
Among these compatibilities, (3) is the most challenging requirement for network software.
Mobile carriers must support at least two protocol versions and verify the availability,
confidentiality, and integrity of the services with only limited information. In particular, it is
almost impossible to identify the capacity of other networks. Some mobile networks in Europe
still support only GSM, while other mobile networks, such as Vodafone and DoCoMo in Japan,
provide UMTS services. DoCoMo supports the Extended UniData (XUDT, max= 2048bytes)
messages, but other 2G networks only support UniData (UDT, max= 256bytes) messages. In
order to achieve compatibility, mobile carriers are often forced to make fundamental changes to
the system architecture.
Security functions also have their own versions in the UMTS networks. UMTS defines
two versions of application contexts for security functions: (1) infoRetrievalContext-v2 for GSM
network (triplet), and (2) infoRetrievalContext-v3 for UMTS network (quintuplet). The message
protocol is the same, but mobile carriers have to change the security functions in accordance with
the parameter (see Figure 3-4).
Source: Based on 3GPP TS 29.002 V6.8.0 [11].
Figure 3-4: Authentication Set List (Message Protocol: Send Authentication Info)
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authenticationSetList CHOICE {
tripletList [0] IMPLICIT SEQUENCE (SIZE( 1 .. 5 )) OF"0" means GSM
SEQUENCE {
rand OCTET STRING ( SIZE( 16)),
sres OCTET STRING ( SIZE( 4)),
kc OCTET STRING ( SIZE( 8)),
!qintpt~- St [1] IMPLICIT SEQUENCE ( SIZE( 1 .. 5 ) ) OF4"1" means UMTS
SEQUENCE {
OCTET STRING ( SIZE( 16)),
ixrs OCTET STRING ( SIZE( 4 .. 16)),
ek OCTET STRING ( SIZE( 16 )),
ik OCTET STRING ( SIZE( 16 )),
autn OCTET STRING ( SIZE( 16 )),
. } OPTIONAL,
Much of the work with the UMTS access architecture has been focused on backward
compatibility with GSM/GPRS networks. From a security viewpoint, however, backward
compatibility with GSM networks is undesirable because they support weaker security
mechanisms than UMTS. Such backward compatibility can result in critical security holes in 3G
mobile systems.
Although backward compatibility between different carriers is not mandatory, commercial
demands for new services, such as global roaming, are key features of 3G systems. Thus, mobile
carriers cannot ignore these compatibility requirements (see Figure 3-5).
rupport both '
av2nd v3)
Previ
GSM networks UMTS networks
Global roaming
Source: Author, 2005.
Figure 3-5: Backward Compatibility in Security functions
3.1.4 Real-time Response (Time Behavior)
Telephony is real-time application software that requires the system to respond
immediately to its requests even in overload situations.2 1 The generic requirements for switching
21. Overload condition means that CPU use exceeds 70%.
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systems specify deadlines for various responses, such as high-call throughput and low-call setup
delays [33][34][35]. In DoCoMo's 3G systems, the performance requirement is 600
transactions/second.2 2 In particular, security functions require 2-10 times higher performance
than other management functions,23 such as location management and supplementary service
functions. The security message (Send Authentication Info) reaches 540 octets in length, which is
the second largest message in the whole MAP protocol. In addition, traffic involving "Send
Authentication Info" is estimated to constitute 17.2% of total traffic2 4 between HLR and
VLR/SGSN. In order to manage huge volume of transactions, many carriers apply the C/C++
programming language.
System performance is important, but mobile carriers must concentrate on both system
reliability and performance. If they focus only on system reliability, the network software will
require so many error-detecting functions that eventually system performance will deteriorate.
On the other hand, if network engineers focus on only system performance, the software will
lack architectural design and finally lose configurability and reliability. Under the short
development time, it is challenging to fulfill both requirements of performance and reliability.
The requirement for real-time response makes it difficult to develop the system design and
implement new versions.
3.1.5 Configurability for Geographical Distribution of the System (Maintainability)
In today's switching systems, a call may be distributed among several sites. Heterogeneous
clusters of nodes cooperate with each other to set up and complete the call. Network software
must not only cover general routing functions but also operate differently in its own environment.
22. This is the requirement for HLR.
23. This data is based on the DoCoMo's project.
24. This data is based on the DoCoMo's network.
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Thus, software engineers must design simple network software configurations to manage the
network systems.
Network software for the HLR is distributed to all of the HLRs in 3G systems; network
software for the MSC, VLR, and SGSN2 5 is delivered to all of the MSCs, VLRs, and SGSNs.
For example, the number of the HLRs in DoCoMo's network exceeds 140. The total number of
CPUs is over 500. Furthermore, a duplex system is applied in each system. In Japan, 91 million
calls are generated every day26 among mobile handsets. A single critical defect in the network
software will create hundreds of defects across the entire network and prevent communication
services.
In the United States, AT&T's long-distance telephone switching centers crashed on
January 15, 1990. A single software defect in the switching center (switching relays) caused
cascading failures in the distributed networks. Sixty thousand people lost their telephone service
completely for nine hours [36]. Such a disaster shows that broad geographical distribution of the
system often magnifies the negative effects of software defects. Configurability is an essential
requirement for limiting failures in the entire network.
3.2 Platform Innovations in Network Software
Time-to-market pressure, and requirements for high quality and cost reduction, are driving
software development toward more disciplined architecture design styles [37][38]. In the quest to
improve flexibility and manage complex systems, firms in many industries are considering
platform-based product development [39][40][41]. Two keys to this approach are: (1) the sharing
25. The MSC, VLR, and SGSN are often integrated in the same network node. In this case
only one network software carries out the MSC/VLR/SGSN functions.
26. Telecommunications Carriers Association (TCA), 2002.
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of components (modules2 7) and (2) other function blocks (subsystems2 8) across a family of
products.
Like physical products, software consists of myriad subsystems and modules that are
connected to each other via numerous interfaces. Thus, the platform-based approach is quite
effective in software development. Historical success stories such as the Sony Walkman [42][43],
and Microsoft's Windows NT [44] Intel's microprocessors [45] have demonstrated the benefits
and the logic behind the platform concept. Platform thinking-the process of identifying and
exploiting commonalities among services, target markets, and the processes for creating and
delivering offerings-appears to be a successful strategy to create new services at low costs.
In terms of product lifecycle, thinking about platforms for families of products rather than
individual products is a key driver behind the success of short-cycle-time companies. In fact, the
software development cycle in network software has shortened from two years to a half year.
Today, mobile carriers are trying to shorten the software lifecycle from six months to three
months. A clear gap between platform concept and practical issues still exists, however, when it
comes to designing, testing, implementing, and managing product families and their successive
platforms [46].
As a first step to filling the gap between platform concept and practical issues, it is
essential to review major platform thinking. The literature addresses a variety of concepts related
to platform thinking: component standardization, architectural innovation, product architecture,
product platform, and product family [8][38][47][48][49][50][51][52][53].
27. Module is the smallest unit in the software (10-1000 lines).
28. In this thesis, "subsystem" means "function block." A subsystem consists of several
modules.
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3.2.1 Component Standardization
Standardizing the software components enables the use of the same module or subsystem
in multiple subsystems. The use of standard components can lower the complexity, cost, and lead
time for product development. Standardized modular systems also provide the ability to achieve
product variety through combining and standardizing components [54][55]. Standardization can
occur only when (1) a component contains commonly useful functions, and (2) the interface of
the component is identical across more than one product [38].
Database AccessII Dtbece II
Data Trac
Subsystem A Subsystem B
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Subsystem C
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I1 ( ]1 Specific function
Source: Author, 2005.
Figure 3-6: Component Standardization in 3G Systems (DoCoMo)
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Figure 3-7: Component Standardization after the First Release (DoCoMo)
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Several common functions, such as database access, encoding/decoding, and data trace
functions were standardized in DoCoMo's network software (see Figure 3-6) during the design
phase of the architecture. After releasing the first version, DoCoMo applied component
standardization in order to implement the common resource management function (see Figure
3-7). This standardization took about a year to accomplish, but it allowed DoCoMo to enhance
the software resource efficiency29 and implement more complex message operations.
3.2.2 Architectural Innovation and Product Architecture
Henderson and Clark found that the traditional categorization of innovation as either
incremental or radical is incomplete and potentially misleading [52]. The authors define an
architectural innovation as "innovations that change the way in which the components of a
product are linked together, while leaving the core design concepts (and thus the basic
knowledge underlying the components) untouched" (p.10). They stress that "The essence of an
architectural innovation is the reconfiguration of an established system to link together existing
components in a new way" (p.12). In the network software development, modifications among
several subsystems to create new features can be considered an architectural innovation. For
example, if DoCoMo decides to implement new SQN management mechanisms, several
subsystems have to change interfaces and modify internal functions without changing core
design and concept.
In terms of implementation, the authors argue that architectural innovations may create
organizational resistance or inertia and tend to hinder the successful adoption of future
architectural innovations. In short, once a dominant platform architecture has emerged, the
29. About 25% of the reduction in memory use
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operating platform and accumulated organizational standards come to reflect the core concept of
the product and create organizational resistance toward the change. The central idea is given in
Figure 3-8.
Core Concepts
Reinforced
Incremental Innovation
Architectural Innovation
Overturned
Modular Innovation
Radical Innovation
Source: Henderson, R., Clark, K. B, 1990 [52], p. 12, Figure 1.
Figure 3-8: A Framework for Defining Innovation
Ulrich [38] defined product architecture as (1) the arrangement of functional elements, (2)
the mapping from the functional elements to physical components, and (3) the specification of
interfaces among interacting physical components. He expands on this definition using several
examples and applies it to software development. In a modular architecture, components have
one or few functional elements (one-to-one mapping) and interfaces among components are well
specified. In an integral architecture components show a complex (non one-to-one) mapping
between functional elements and components and interfaces among components are not well
defined. The main argument is that product innovations are linked to the architecture of the
product (see Figure 3-9).
Several scholars view a modular architecture as ideal. Alexander [56] presents that an
optimal design methodology can be achieved by avoiding coupling between components. Suh
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[57] argues that a modular architecture is an axiom of good design that can avoid
manufacturing/design failures. Meyer and Lehnerd [8] point out that achieving modularity while
minimizing the number of interfaces between subsystems is the essence of elegance in software
design. Baldwin and Clark [58] describe that modularity in design can tremendously boost the
rate of innovation.
Software development also requires modularity and flexibility. In the software engineering,
the notion of module cohesion or strength can be considered the one-to-one mapping of
functional elements to components [59]. Modular architecture is expected to increase the reuse
rate and to avoid complex interfaces among components. Modularity also helps localize the
modification of software and enhances software quality. Hac [60] verified that architectural
dependencies between components and degree of parallelism in the components affect the
software reliability. On the other hand, integrated architecture with unspecified interfaces among
components is not desirable for localizing implementation risks.
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- Minimum order lead time dictated by final
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would require high fixed costs (e.g. tooling),
high set-up costs, large order lead times,
and/or high inventory costs.
Low
- May fabricate components to order as well
as assemble to order.
- May choose to carry component inventories
to minimize order lead time.
- Infinite variety is possible when components
are fabricated to order.
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- Minimum order lead times dictated by both
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- Infinite variety is possible.
High
Component Process Flexibility
Source: Ulrich, K, 1995 [38], p. 430, Figure 8.
Figure 3-9: Product Architecture and Component Process Flexibility
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3.2.3 Product Platform and Product Family
Meyer [8] defines product platform as "a set of subsystems and interfaces that form a
common structure from which a stream of related products can be efficiently developed and
produced." A product platform is often defined in terms of physical components, but a product
platform also can be defined in terms of software. The product platform is the basis for
developing new product variants. Several variants can be found in network software. For
example, the security function for the GSM network is a variant of the original security function
for the UMTS network. The algorithms applied to generate authentication vectors differ, but the
basic architecture of the subsystems is quite similar.
Several authors [8][48][53] define "family" as individual products that share common
technology and address related market applications. According to Simpson [50], a product family
is a group of related products that share common features, components, and subsystems, and
satisfy a variety of market niches. A product family comprises a set of variables, features, or
components that remain constant from product to product (product platform) and others that vary
from product to product [50]. The distinctive aspects between individual product variants are the
difference in their structure. Meyer and Lehnerd [8][48] propose a general framework for
product family development (see Figure 3-10) that represents a single product family beginning
with the initial development of a product platform. This platform is followed by successive major
enhancements to the core product and process technology of that platform, with derivative
product development within each generation. New generations of the product family can be
based on either an extension of the product platform or on an entirely new product platform. In
case of an extension, the group of subsystems and interfaces remains constant.
However, one or more subsystems sometimes must undergo major revision to reduce costs
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or to add new features. An entirely new platform emerges only when its basic architecture
changes and aims at value cost leadership and new market applications (see Figure 3-11).
Systems and interfaces from prior generations may be carried forward into the new design but
are joined by entirely new subsystems and interfaces [8][51].
Time
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Source: Meyer and Lehnerd, 1997 [8], p. 36, Figure 2-4.
Figure 3-10: Product Family Evolution
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Figure 3-11: Typology of Platform Change in Product Family Evolution
3.3 Difficulties in Platform Innovation
A variety of requirements can prevent platform innovations of network software. Van Der
Linden and Miiller [61][62] illustrate the architectural requirements for software (see Figure
3-12). Quality (high quality), cost (low development effort), and delivery (short lead time) are
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the fundamental software requirements, and these elements significantly affect other architectural
requirements: extensibility, reusability, configurability, and so on. Each requirement
interconnects and sometimes conflicts with others (e.g., quality vs. cost). In addition, market
demands for flexibility, accountability, and robustness also complicate software requirements,
creating trade-offs and potential difficulties for platform innovation.
Source: Van der Linden and MUller, 1995 [61], p. 52, Figure 1.
Figure 3-12: Requirements for Network Software
3.3.1 Time-to-Market Pressure
Market demands for new services and severe competition in the mobile telecommunication
market create strong pressure to shorten development time. The lead time for platform upgrading
has deceased from two years to six months in DoCoMo's system. In today's market, mobile
carriers are now trying to shorten the software life cycle from six months to three months. In this
situation, mobile carriers are forced to develop several versions of software at the same time (see
Figure 3-13).
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Three problems lie in this software development timeline: (1) the new version is inevitably
based on the imperfect platform of the previous version, (2) the new version is expected to fix all
the defects found in the previous version, and (3) architectural change is almost impossible.
In particular, security functions are fundamental features of the platform. The new
platform architecture needs sufficient testing to confirm performance and reliability. Under the
traditional development process (i.e., the rigid waterfall model) it is quite challenging to alter the
software architecture in such a short time. Today's insufficient development time prevents
platform innovation and renders the platform architecture less reliable and flexible.
Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug
I I I I I I I I
Designing Coding Testing Release
Develo~pment 1 About three months
Transfer the - Release
parental platform Bugs-Fixed Development 2
Designing * Development 3
Source: Data is based on the firms' Annual Reports and personal interviews [63].
Figure 3-13: Software Development to Satisfy Short Development Time
3.3.2 Pressures for Cost Reduction
Cost reduction pressures also hinder platform innovations. As Voas mentions, it is quite
difficult to achieve better (high quality) and cheaper software in a limited development time [64].
The total budget for software development is also strictly limited. For example, DoCoMo has a
budget limit for each software development project (5-10 billions) and the company slashes
development costs (estimates) by 10-15% across the board. In addition, DoCoMo requires
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partner developers, such as NEC, NTT Comware, and Fujitsu, to reduce their development costs
from ¥10,000 to ¥7,000 per line. In order to reduce development costs, these developers are
forced to implement less functional and less flexible (less modularized) functions. In terms of
security functions, the generation and management of SQN functions are insufficiently
implemented to cut development costs and to meet the delivery deadlines.
Security is part of the fundamental functions in the platform. Software modifications in the
fundamental functions are considered too risky, and such modifications require enormous
development time and cost. In addition, unlike other new services, the security function itself
does not generate profits, so mobile carriers have less desire to upgrade the security mechanisms.
Once security functions are implemented, platform renewal is quite challenging and almost
impossible within limited budgets.
3.3.3 Requirements for High Reliability
Network software operates in real-time telecommunications systems. Critical errors
immediately produce disastrous outcomes worldwide. Therefore, reliability is crucial in any new
platform. However, compared with the existing platform, a new platform is less stable. Before
innovating a platform, network engineers must fix all software problems and improve software
quality. Most engineers do not have time to change the platform architecture. Ironically, after
fixing these problems, network engineers also cannot readily innovate the platform architecture.
The debugged platform is considered more stable than a brand-new platform. The requirement
for high reliability limits architectural platform innovation and results in low extensibility of the
software.
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3.3.4 Complex Architecture
The architecture of network software is very complex. A system is comprised of myriad
small modules and millions of lines of code. Approximately 80 operations3 0 are defined in 3G
networks, and each operation has several versions in order to satisfy backward compatibility.
Message translation (encoding/decoding) functions, message handling functions (scenario
control), and error detection functions (checking for tags, length and values) are individually
designed in the system. From the viewpoint of database access, access interfaces (select, update
and delete) are developed for each database element. Consequently, over 1,000 modules co-exist
in the network software. As the number of supported services increases, the software architecture
and module interfaces become more complex. Extensibility and testability are lost, and platform
innovation in network software becomes very difficult.
than 800
ions
- --- .vluss, _llWS
Source: Author, 2005.
Figure 3-14: Complex Architecture and Interfaces in Network Software
30. The operations are designed for Mobile Application Parts (MAP). Mobile carriers often
implement own operations to satisfy specific requirements in their networks.
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Sometimes module architecture is also complex. Time-critical modules, such as message
operation and network authentication, are designed to maximize system performance. Unlike
other modules, these time-critical modules utilize the knowledge of assembler language and form
the performance-oriented architecture. Only a few software engineers can evaluate the minimum
buffer size, modify the best data type, and apply the most appropriate methods for the operation.
Among the time-critical modules, security functions (see Figure 2-5, Figure 2-6) are
considered some of the most difficult functions in the HLR/AuC. If we investigate the lines of
code for the security functions, we will find that these security functions occupy less than one
percent3 in DoCoMo's system. However, we also find that the code is extremely sophisticated
and that it is quite hard to change the original architecture.
3.3.5 Scalability
Scalability often prevents platform innovations in network software. In order to satisfy the
various requirements for functionality, reliability, efficiency, and maintainability, network
software development requires a huge volume of initial development (often over 800 KLOC32 33)
with highly sophisticated technical expertise in the areas of platform design, protocol, and traffic
management. Furthermore, every six to twelve months new features with 200-500KL are added
to the network software. Griffeth and Lin observed this trend and mentioned that size of the
network software and the number of features are steadily increasing [30]. In DoCoMo's case, the
accumulated source code has reached about 2.5 million lines of code (HLR). Consequently,
31. The security algorithm function (fl) needs only 100 lines of code. Even if we add other
security algorithm functions, such as f2-f5, these security functions are less than 2 KLOC.
32. KLOC means "kilo lines of codes." In this thesis KL also means KLOC.
33. When DoCoMo implemented its 3G systems in 2001, the total development size of the
HLR and the switching center (MSC/VLR/SGSN) reached 835KL and over 1.5ML respectively.
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thousands of subsystems coexist in the same platform, and the interfaces among modules are
increasingly complex. Given the short development time, new features make it difficult to
complete software development and accomplish the platform innovation [65][66].
The aggregate size of the network software continually increases because of new functions
(services) and requirements for compatibility and robustness. For example, if a new security
function is added, it must consider backward compatibility and numerous semi-normal routes.
When a new feature is added to the network node, it can affect millions of lines of code and tens
or even hundreds of other features. Because of heterogeneity, network carriers must multiply this
effect by the number of different kinds of switches in the network. In order to avoid the
large-scale failure caused by software defects, numerous sensitive tests are inevitably required
(over 10,000 tests in each subsystem). Many network engineers, therefore, hesitate to make
architectural changes in the platform.
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4 Analysis of the Existing Network Software
Four years have passed since DoCoMo launched the first 3G mobile systems in Japan.
DoCoMo initially started 3G services in large cities, such as Tokyo, Kyoto, Osaka, Kobe, and
Nagoya areas, and as of October 2005 3G services were available to approximately 99% of
Japan's population. With a maximum downlink speed of 384 kbps-forty times faster than
conventional wireless data communications-DoCoMo provides smooth and high-capacity
communications for large-volume data such as movie images. Today over 17 million subscribers
enjoy DoCoMo's 3G services without serious problems.
Security functions are used in almost all mobile terminal-oriented services (e.g., call setup,
location update, and supplementary services). Authorized network access prevents fraudulent
communications and maintains systems integrity. However, breaches in the security mechanisms
can result in serious consequences in mobile communications.3 4 DoCoMo recently announced
that no fraudulent communications from cloned mobile handsets had been found in its 3G
systems. In order to maintain this desirable situation, the security features must be correctly and
reliably designed.
Systems performance is also a critical issue in security management. In the near future3 5
DoCoMo plans to migrate completely from its 2G services (PDC) to 3G services (UMTS).
Security functions will have to manage over 10 billion authentication requests generated by 50
million subscribers. Performance will become a bottleneck in DoCoMo's 3G systems.
Examining the DoCoMo's project data from 1998 to 2003 and analyzing the actual source
codes implemented in DoCoMo's network software, I found that DoCoMo's security
34. If fraudulent communications comprise even one percent of traffic revenue, the
damages are ¥212,316 million /year ($202 million/year).
35. The original target was in 2006; however, the migration is likely to longer.
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mechanisms are insufficiently implemented to prevent fraudulent communications and to support
high performance. The platform extension already has reached its limits to solve current
implementation problems. Thus, platform renewal will be crucial for the DoCoMo's network
software. On the basis of the platform concepts discussed previously, this chapter will analyze
the security mechanisms in the existing network software.
4.1 Insufficient Implementation of the Authentication Mechanisms
Several security features in DoCoMo's 3G systems differ from the global standards
defined by the 3GPP. Table 4-1 and Figure 4-1 show the differences between DoCoMo's
implementation and the global specifications. The critical differences are: (1) SQN in the
DoCoMo's network has a fixed value and a re-synchronization procedure is not implemented; (2)
the network software is designed to support only fixed security parameters; and (3) AMF is not
used in DoCoMo's network. In addition, DoCoMo only applies MAP in its network, so the
authentication data between the HLR/AuC and the VLR/SGSN can be eavesdropped. The
important point is that implemented security features are vulnerable to fraudulent
communications (critical security features are missing in the implementation) but no
countermeasures have been taken for so far.
The implemented platform architecture also differs from the desired architecture that
supports sufficient security mechanisms. The original platform is quite simple and well
modularized. If DoCoMo maintains the modularity when implementing new security features,
the desired platform will also become modularized. In reality, however, the implemented
platform lacks sufficient modularity and several important security features. In order to identify
the differences, Figure 4-2 illustrates the original software architecture and the desired software
architecture in DoCoMo's systems.
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Table 4-1: Differences between DoCoMo's Network and 3GPP Specifications
No. DoCoMo Network 3GPP Specifications (UMTS) Notes
HLR contains AuC in the same AuC can be separated from AuC is integrated as one
hardware and software. HLR. subsystem in the HLR.
The number of requested The number of requested
2 authentication vectors is always authentication vectors can vary vectors.
5. from 1 to 5.
DoCoMo applies IMSI to3 SQN has fixed value. SQN always changes. create SQN.
create SQN.
No re-synchronization Re-synchronization procedure DoCoMo's HLR does not
procedure is implemented. is stipulated. change the SQN.
The size of AUTS is always 16 The size of AUTS varies from DoCoMo only supports
octets. 12 to 16 octets. the fixed value.
The size of XRES is always 16 The size of XRES varies from 4 DoCoMo only supports
octets. to 16 octets. the fixed value.
HLR/AuC stores SQN DoCoMo's HLR does not7 HLR/AuC does not store SQN. (SQNHE)change the SQN.(SQNHE). change the SQN.
HLR/AuC does not check DoCoMo's HLR reduces
MAC. the procedure.
AMF is not used in AMF is used to change the Top 4 bits= all 0, other 12
authentication procedure. authentication functions. bits: do not care
Only MAP is implemented to A security extension to MAP contains no security
10 transfer authentication data. called MAPsec is defined functionality against
eavesdropping.
Source: Author, 2005.
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Figure 4-1: Authentication Mechanisms in DoCoMo's Systems
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Figure 4-2: Comparison of the Software Architecture for Authentication Mechanisms
(The Original Software Architecture (Left) and the Desired Software Architecture (Right))
4.1.1 Insufficient SQN Management
As described in Chapter 2, SQN is applied to protect against replay attacks in the network.
Any arbitrary jumps in sequence numbers means possible fraudulent network access. 3GPP
specifications suggest several methods for generating SQN: partly time-based, entirely
time-based, and not time-based. However, DoCoMo has opted not to implement this mechanism
in order to simplify SQN management (see Figure 4-3).
| SQN 1
Not imf lemented
I 1 i I rv I i I
I D-I r I I r _ Ir I
Source: Author, 2005.
Figure 4-3: Software Architecture in DoCoMo's Network (UMTS)
The SQN in DoCoMo's network has a fixed value based on IMSI (see Figure 4-4 and
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Figure 4-5), a unique fixed number that identifies a certain subscriber worldwide.36 Extracting
X3 7 bits from IMSI, DoCoMo's HLR/AuC generates SQNHE. SQNHE has dummy counters in the
top and the bottom of the value, but these counters are not used to verify the SQN. After
receiving the authentication parameters, USIM in the mobile handset compares the SQNHE with
the same part of the IMSI stored in the mobile handset (SQNMS). The important point is that both
SQNs (SQNHE and SQNMs) are generated from the fixed value (IMSI). SQN does not change in
the DoCoMo's authentication mechanisms. As long as the mobile handset knows its own IMSI,
the SQN comparison is always coincident in the DoCoMo's network (see Figure 4-6).
Consequently, HLR and USIM do not have to store and track the value of SQN (SQNHE and
SQNMs) in the system.
Source: 3GPP TS 23.003 V6.5.0 [67].
Figure 4-4: Structure of IMSI in the DoCoMo's Network
36. IMSI is different from MSISDN (mobile telephone number).
37. This value cannot be given for security reasons.
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Figure 4-5: Generation of SQN in the DoCoMo's Network
DoCoMo also reduced the re-synchronization procedure, which ensures the accuracy and
freshness of SQN in the systems. Ideally, re-synchronization procedure can help detect potential
fraud. However, as discussed above, the SQN used in the DoCoMo's network always remain the
same value. Comparison of SQN (SQNHE and SQNMs) does not provide any significant
information. Therefore, DoCoMo decided to omit this re-synchronization procedure completely.
· The generation of SQN is based on a fixed value (SQN comparison is always true).
· The HLR and USIM do not store and track the value of SQN.
* The re-synchronization procedure for SQN is not implemented in DoCoMo's network.
38. These values cannot be given for security reasons. b+c = constant.
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Figure 4-6: Verification of SQN in the DoCoMo's Network
4.1.2 Support Only Fixed-length Parameters
Several DoCoMo's functions are designed to support only fixed length parameters. The
authentication procedure in GSM supports only traditional authentication algorithms with fixed
length parameters (see Figure 4-7), and UMTS supports enhanced authentication algorithm with
variable length parameters. In order to enhance the security features, 3GPP specifications
recommend that mobile carriers support variable length security parameters (AUTS and XRES).
However, DoCoMo did not implement this requirement to reduce development time and cost.
Consequently, the authentication message in DoCoMo's network always forms 540 octets in the
same order. When eavesdropping on the authentication messages in DoCoMo's network, one can
easily analyze the message structure.
AuthenticationTriplet ::= SEQUENCE {
rand RAND, --16 octets fixed
sres SRES, --4 octets fixed
kc Kc, --8 octets fixed
Source: 3GPP TS 29.002 V6.8.0 [11], p341.
Figure 4-7: Verification of SQN in the DoCoMo's Network
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From the viewpoint of the software architecture, the AuC functions for GSM networks are
completely integrated in the existing subsystem (see Figure 4-8). In this integral architecture
subsystems form a complex (non one-to-one) mapping between functional elements and
architecture and interfaces or boundaries between subsystems are not defined. The AuC for
UMTS generates the quintuplets (authentication vectors) and derives the triplet for GSM
networks by means of the standardized conversion functions in the subsystem. Changes in the
UMTS authentication functions directly affect the GSM authentication functions. This integrated
software architecture makes network software inflexible.
* DoCoMo only supports fixed length parameters in authentication (Degradation of the
authentication mechanisms).
* The AuC functions are completely integrated in DoCoMo's system (software
architecture is inflexible).
lemented
E PII P I P3 I
l P4 I P I P I
I . I _ I
Source: Author, 2005.
Figure 4-8: Completely Integrated AuC functions
4.1.3 No Support for AMF
The authentication management field, AMF, is a 16-bit component of the authentication
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AuC
AuC Not imi
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vector (part of the AUTN). AMF is supposed to enhance the security features of the network.
AMF can be used for purposes, such as support for multiple authentication algorithms,
verification of sequence number freshness, and threshold values to change the lifetime of the
authentication keys. The use of AMF is not standardized by 3GPP but is specified by each
mobile carrier.
Since the first service release in 2001, DoCoMo has not used AMF in its authentication
procedure. The structure of AMF in DoCoMo's network is shown in Figure 4-9. The top four bits
are all set at 0, and the other bits are ignored ("don't care"). Currently, DoCoMo's network
software does not check the top four bits, which means AMF has become an entirely useless
parameter in DoCoMo's network. This inadequate security design will make mobile systems
vulnerable to unauthorized access in mobile communications.
Also, DoCoMo does not apply SQN management mechanisms. Network authentication is
mainly based on the K (secret key) and SQN. Once intruders find out the K by replay attacks, it
is quite possible to enable fraudulent communications. Without using AMF in DoCoMo's
network, it is challenging to enhance security features.
* DoCoMo has not utilized AMF to enhance security features.
· New security algorithms cannot be applied.
* If K is detected by replay attacks, fraudulent communications are possible.
:op~bits'vallO ='.....:Other 12 bits = don't care
Source: Author, 2005.
Figure 4-9: AMF in DoCoMo's Network
4.2 Reasons for Insufficient implementation
As discussed above, DoCoMo's network authentication mechanisms are insufficiently
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implemented to prevent fraudulent communications, and this inadequate system design will
make mobile systems vulnerable to unauthorized access. In order to analyze this situation, I
applied a framework that is designed to highlight the role of organizational processes in complex
social and technical systems [68]. This framework focuses on 5 perspectives-strategic,
economic, engineering, political, and social/cultural-that reflect years of studies, interviews,
observations, research and participation in organization [69].
By integrating the framework above with a fishbone diagram (see Figure 4-10), we can
identify five major reasons for the current situation: (1) pressure of time to market, (2) pressure
of cost reduction, (3) requirement for high reliability, (4) complex architecture, and (5)
insufficient platform thinking.
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4.2.1 Strategic Viewpoint
As a leading mobile carrier, it was critical for DoCoMo to launch the world's first 3G
mobile services. However, in 1999 software development was three months behind schedule. In
order to accelerate software development for launch of 3G services worldwide in May 2001,3 9
DoCoMo had to simplify its security functions and concentrate on software productivity. In 2000
DoCoMo still fell behind schedule (see Figure 4-11), which meant there was no time to improve
the original platform. Time constraints did not allow DoCoMo to apply long-term platform
thinking.
2000 2001
Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May '" Oct
Original Designing/Coding/Testing Field Test
Schedule ' Release (final version)
Actual
Schedule
Designing/Coding/Testing Field Test Trial service
3 months delay 6 months delay
Source: Author, 2005.
Figure 4-11: Original Schedule vs. Actual Schedule
Moreover, once security mechanisms are implemented and released to the market, it is
much more difficult to change the software architecture. Security comprises fundamental
functions in the platform, and failures of upgraded functions can produce critical errors. The
software lifecycle has become shortened-from two years, to one year, to three to six months
39. The original release schedule was May 30, 2001, but actual launch was October 2001.
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today. With such insufficient development time, it is too risky to change the original platform. In
addition, several new software versions are developed during the same period of time, and each
modification must work both backward to earlier version and forward to new versions. However,
problems often arise because the network engineers who work on the second (or subsequent)
versions are usually different from those who worked on the first version, which causes
communication problems in the backward/forward reviewing activity. Serious efforts must be
dedicated to modifying the operating platform.
* The first release of the 3G system worldwide was critical for DoCoMo.
* The development fell behind the schedule+Focus on the productivity
· Time constraints did not allow DoCoMo to apply "platform renewal."
* Once implemented, the current platform is considered more reliable and robust.
* Network engineers change from version to version.
* Platform modifications affect other software versions under development.
4.2.2 Economic Viewpoint
Severe market competition continually forces mobile carriers to reduce the software
development costs. In the software development DoCoMo heavily relies on partner companies,
such as NEC, NTT Comware, and Fujitsu (see Figure 4-12). Typically, software development
costs are based on the scale of development. Therefore, DoCoMo strictly restricts the
development size and tries to reduce expenditures to partner companies. In fact, security
functions account for only 5 KLOC, which is less than 1% of KLOC in the total software
development.
Given the insufficiently implemented security mechanisms, the perceived security level is
lower than the desired security level. If there is a high consequence breach of security, the
situation will shift to support more security features (see Figure 4-13). However, no fraudulent
communications have been found to date, which means the level of security can be considered
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sufficient. Moreover, unlike other new services, such as global roaming, auto answering, and call
waiting, the security function is not viewed as generating profits. Lack of understanding of the
importance of security and profit-oriented culture did not allow the organization to implement
sufficient security mechanisms.
Making changes in the security functions could imply not only the additional expenditure
but also the possibility of failure in the architectural design, which the organization does not wish
to admit. Thus, once the bottom line of the security functions is satisfied, it is far more
challenging to change the organizational mindset and improve existing functions.
System Sofware Program Coding Testing peratns 
Requirements
DoCoMo's Partners (NEC, Fujitsu and other NTT Groups)
DoCoMo supervises all of the processes =6-18 months
Source: Author, 2005.
Figure 4-12: Network Software Development of DoCoMo
Risk
Perceived
Bottom Line
Desired Bottom
Line
DoCoMo Desired State Cost
Source: Author, 2005.
Figure 4-13: Risk vs. Cost for Security Functions
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The cost reduction pressure leads DoCoMo to choose the least cost architecture. A limited
budget and severe market competition cause this pressure, but it is important to point out
DoCoMo's own rule, which is to decrease development costs. Initial development requires
sophisticated expertise, so the original cost (payment to partner companies) for one line of codes
reaches about ¥10,000. However, the second and third versions are less difficult to develop
because the accumulated knowledge allows partner companies to reduce the costs. In the
DoCoMo's rule, the discount rate is 10 to 15% in each version. Consequently, the cost per line of
codes usually drops from ¥10,000 to ¥7,000.
Security functions are extremely difficult to manage. Considering the enormous efforts
required to achieve zero defects, DoCoMo's partner companies tend to avoid changing the
original architecture. The problem is that security mechanisms are mission critical, but DoCoMo
does not distinguish the difference between mission-critical and non-mission-critical functions.
Instead DoCoMo applies the same standards to reduce the development costs.
* In order to reduce the development costs, DoCoMo restricts the software size (scale).
* Security functions are considered less profitable than other services.
* Cost reduction pressure forces DoCoMo to choose the least cost architecture (lack of
platform thinking).
* The 10 to 15% cost reduction rule does not give incentives to improve the insufficient
platform.
* DoCoMo does not distinguish the difference between mission critical and non-mission
critical functions, instead applying the same rule to reduce the development costs.
4.2.3 Engineering Viewpoint
As discussed in Chapter 3.3.4, the architecture of network software is complex with over
1,000 modules in the same platform. These modules are interconnected, and the complexity
increases dramatically when the number of modules increases (see Figure 4-14). Furthermore, in
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order to achieve high performance, several software engineering principles (e.g., less coupling
among modules and strong cohesion) are intentionally disregarded when it comes to the security
functions. Combining the knowledge of the operating system, hardware, and assembler language,
engineers have to develop a performance-oriented architecture. An extremely high level of
expertise is required to modify existing security functions (see Table 4-2). After implementing
the first version and fixing software defects associated with the security functions, very few
engineers can consider changing the basic architecture.
Complexity
6000-8000
2500-3000
300-500
Comnleitv 
100 500 1000 Number of Modules
Note: Complexity is based on the number of interfaces among modules (subsystems)
Source: Author, 2005.
Figure 4-14: Number of Modules and Complexity of the System
Network software operates in real-time telecommunication systems. HLR/AuCs are
geographically distributed in DoCoMo's network (a total of 140 units and 500+ CPUs), and the
same network software operates in different hardware. Like AT&T's case in 1990, critical errors
in mission critical functions immediately cause disastrous outcomes worldwide. Thus, zero
defects are mandatory in any new platform.
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Table 4-2: Examples of the Coding Rules for Time-Critical Modules
No. Requirements Expected Effects Notes
Apply minimum buffer size It depends on the buffer1 400u seconds better(copy and clear) size.
Use the same the buffer between Modularization rule is not2 60 ,u seconds better
subsystems applied.
3 Avoid using many variables 2-3 u seconds better O prefers fewer
variables.
It depends on the number4 Check the search logic 10 seconds better of messages.
of messages.
NEC OS prefers the5 Avoid bit calculation 2-3 u seconds better "ULONG" types
"ULONG" types
NEC OS prefers the6 Avoid CHAR types 2-3 tu seconds better "ULONG" types
Apply "switch-case" instead of NEC OS prefers the
7 "if-else" 2-3 u seconds better "switch-case"
Source: Author, 2005.
In addition, as discussed in Chapter 2, security functions are implemented in both mobile
handsets and HLR/AuC. Over 17 million subscribers enjoy 3G services and the number is
increasing. Changes in the essential security mechanisms (algorithms) lead to significant
modifications in both USIM and HLR/AuC. One software defect can result in critical outcomes.
Under this situation, it is quite challenging to prove the normality and necessity of upgrading the
security features. Today's authentication mechanisms are not sufficient, but the requirement for
high reliability prevents DoCoMo from making architectural innovations in the platform and
leads DoCoMo to focus on incremental innovations.
· The platform architecture and security mechanisms are complex.
· A high level of expertise is required to modify the platform.
· Zero defects are crucial in the new platform (requirement for high reliability).
4 It is quite hard to prove the normality and necessity of new security functions.
· USIM in mobile handsets also needs to change when essential security mechanisms
(algorithms) are modified.
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4.2.4 Political Viewpoint
At present no government agency or investigation is required to verify the security
functions. Implementation and security standards depend entirely on the mobile carriers
themselves. As long as no evidence of fraudulent communication is found, the government does
not impose regulations. If implemented security mechanisms function perfectly, and the network
is secure, the situation remains stable and there is little worry. In the real world, however, no
company can rely on weak security assumptions such as: (1) fraudulent communications can be
detected and traced systematically, and (2) other networks are also secure.
In the discussion of security functions in Chapter 2, I noted that it is possible to track
potential fraudulent communications. An analysis of the "Authentication Failure Report (failure
messages during user authentication)" messages from VLR/SGSN allows mobile carriers to
detect possible fraudulent communications. Data trace functions also help analyze the real traffic
data of the target user.
However, DoCoMo has not utilized these mechanisms. Fraud detection relies heavily on
human recognition by operators. DoCoMo's HLR/AuC can receive error messages from
VLR/SGSN, but no systematic data analysis is conducted. If operators in each location (e.g.,
Tokyo area, Hokkaido area, and Osaka area) overlook the error information, clues about potential
fraudulent communications will be completely lost. In this case only claims or complaints from
end-users will likely trigger an investigation into fraudulent communications.
In addition, receiving unfamiliar messages is often considered a defect in the network
software rather than a clue about fraudulent communications. On the basis of the DoCoMo's
security assumptions (i.e., fraudulent communications are technologically impossible), software
defects are more likely than unexpected problems. Without complaints about fraud from
end-users, operators rarely expect to encounter fraudulent communications.
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DoCoMo proceeds under the assumption that other networks are also secure. Compared
with GSM networks, 3G networks are not as widely deployed around the world. If DoCoMo's
subscribers go to other networks that support only GSM systems, GSM authentication
mechanisms are inevitably applied. Also, some 3G networks do not implement security
mechanisms, such as encryption, in their access links (the air zone between a mobile handset and
the core network). In these cases DoCoMo cannot guarantee perfect authentication. Network
traffic could be subject to eavesdropping and analysis by intruders. DoCoMo's simplified
security mechanisms more easily allow intruders to access the network.
DoCoMo's official position is that fraudulent communications, mainly via cloned mobile
phones, are impossible in 3G mobile systems. However, we can conclude that this statement is
based on weak security assumptions and is not dependable.
* No specific government regulation or investigation exists for security management.
* No sufficient fraud detection mechanisms are applied in DoCoMo's network.
-Risk assessment and risk control40 are insufficient.
+Fraud detection heavily relies on the human recognition.
(We cannot trust the announcement that guarantees "perfect security.")
· Other networks (GSM and sometimes UMTS) are not so secured.
Security holes exist in the communications between DoCoMo and other networks.
4.2.5 Social/Cultural Viewpoint
DoCoMo was spun off from Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (NTT) in April
1992. Thirteen years have passed, but a basic corporate culture is similar to NTT's, i.e., very
conservative. A peace-at-any-price principle prevails, and changes in fundamental functions are
considered too dangerous. As Henderson and Clark describe [52], architectural innovations
40. Risk assessment mainly involves risk identification and risk analysis. Risk control
consists of risk management planning, risk resolution and risk monitoring [70].
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create organizational resistance or inertia and tend to hinder the successful adoption of future
architectural innovations.
No fraudulent communications mainly via cloned mobile phones have been found so far in
DoCoMo's 3G systems. Current security functions seem to be operating well. In this
conservative culture, it is quite difficult to correct the insufficient authentication mechanisms and
suggest platform innovations in its systems.
* DoCoMo's corporate culture is conservative.
* Organizational resistance tends to hinder platform change.
4.3 Tradeoffs between Performance and Security
4.3.1 Dynamic Steps
Another critical bottleneck in DoCoMo's security mechanisms is performance. Network
software must guarantee a real-time response for transactions. Table 4-3 shows the number of
required transactions in DoCoMo's systems. Security functions are categorized in the basic call
function and must operate at 600 TPS within 70% CPU usage. Above 70% CPU usage, some
messages cannot be delivered on time (i.e., less than 30 seconds) and sometimes these messages
are lost. Among the basic call functions, security functions require the most powerful CPU
resources (see Figure 4-15). The security functions (Send Authentication Info + Send
Authentication Info ack) need 2.7 to 8.7 times higher CPU performance than other functions. In
particular, the generation of authentication vectors (Chapter 2.4) consumes much of the CPU's
time. If the generation function is not required, HLR/AuC can process a single authentication
transaction in 402.5 gu seconds; but if the generation function is implemented, it takes 2,607.4 u
seconds41 (6.5 times higher). The total size of the security functions is small (less than 1% of
41. This data is based on the first version of the software. Thereafter, DoCoMo did not
measure the performance.
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KLOC in the total software development), but the influence becomes significantly large in the
operation.
Table 4-3: Major Differences among Subsystems (Call Functions)
Subsystem Required Spe uired Qul Required Resources
Basic call function High. (max600 TPS2 ) Extremely high Large
(including security)
Supplementary
service function Low (max 200TPS) High Smallservice function
O&M function Very Low Medium Small(less than 10 TPS)
Notes:
1) Each CPU has to satisfy the required TPS (Transactions Per Second).
2) One transaction equals a pair of messages: receiving and sending.
Source: Author, 2005.
The required number of dynamic steps for the security functions decreased from 209,420
in the first version to 143,861 in the third version. However, this decrease resulted from small
modifications, such as changes in the buffer size and avoidance of bit calculation. Most of the
small modifications had already been applied to the current platform. In fact, after the third
version the number of dynamics steps remained virtually the same. Given the implementation of
new services, the number of dynamics steps is now increasing little by little (146,862 steps in the
sixth version in 2003). Platform extension to improve performance had reached its limits.
* Security functions (especially, generation of authentication vectors) require the highest
CPU performance.
* The lines of codes for security functions are small, but greatly affect the systems
performance.
* Small modifications (platform extension) to improve performance have already reached
the limit.
* New security features face tradeoffs between performance and functionality.
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Steps
250,000
200,000
150,000
100,000
50,000
0
Required Dynamic Steps
*i SAI + SAI ack i
*UL+ISD i
i - - . . - .............. Cl 1U acK + UL ack
SRI + PRN
* PRN ack + SRI ack 
*PMS+PMS ack
1st ver. 2nd ver. 3rd ver. 6th ver.
SAI: Send Authentication Info, UL: Update location, ISD: Insert Subscriber Data, SRI: Send
Routing Info, PRN: Provide Roaming Number, PMS: Purge MS
First Second Third Sixth
Version Version Version Version
Send :Authenticaio e 2 420 i!38 143861 46862 Autnic ao .
Authentication6 nfo a _____
Update location + Insert Subscriber Location
55,154 69,482 54,015Data , managements
Insert Subscriber Data ack + Update 37,221 28 Location
location ack management
Send Routing Info + Provide Terminating calls
Roaming Number (From HLR to VLR)
80,871Provide Roaming Number ack + 34,908 22,879 26,412 Terminating calls
Send Routing Info ack (from VLR to HLR)
Purge MS + Purge MS ack 38,294 31,357 28,836 Location and routing
management
Send Routing Info for SM + Send Supplementary
Routing Info for SM ack 47,046 service
MAP CLOSE 20,056 - - Termination
Send Routing Info for GPRS +Send Routing Info for GPRS ack 31,987 31,987 22,996 28,913 Packet callsSend Routin Info for GPRS ack
Source: Author, 2005.
Figure 4-15: Required Dynamic Steps for Basic Call Functions
42. This location management is DoCoMo's specific operation including both circuit and
packet update location.
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4.3.2 Network Traffic
The network traffic affects the systems performance. Authentication messages influence
the systems by (1) amount of traffic and (2) message length. On the basis of the network traffic
in PDC services, it is estimated that the traffic for "Send Authentication Info (SAI)" constitutes
17.2% of total traffic in HLR (see Table 4-4). Actual traffic data from the Yokohama unit
supports this traffic model (see Figure 4-16). These traffic data suggest that authentication
mechanisms operate more frequently than terminating call functions and short message functions.
Thus, the increase in security traffic will significantly affect systems performance.
Table 4-4: Network Traffic of 3G Services
No. Operation Ratio Max Length NoteRati (Octets)
....... U  a ... .. .. .... l.c ........n + :I. .. . 9 (U3LocatiOn 
S. bc r.b. ata ... 7.-. 0 tli':: (*)) ._" '._:
Insert Subscriber Data ack + 21 (ISD ack)
Update location ack 33 (UL ack)ocaton management
3 Authentiki- n. end 1Autheticatio 
....... Autentication. I. a, $40 (S:l a.k) "_ _. -. :_,
Send Routing Info, Send 127 (SRI)
4 Info ack6.1% 151 (SRI ack)Terminating calls
___ Routing Info ack _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _)
5 Provide Roamng Number, 3% 137 (PRN) Terminating calls
Provide Roaming Number ack
6 Send Routing Info for GPRS, 97 (SRG)
Send Routing Info for GPRS ack 101 (SRG ack)
7 Others 2.8% 112 (SRS ack) Supplementary services
UL: Update location, ISD: Insert Subscriber Data, SAI: Send Authentication Info, SRI: Send
Routing Info, PRN: Provide Roaming Number, SRG: Send Routing Info for GPRS, SRS: Send
Routing Info for SM
Source: Author, 2005.
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The length of the SAI message also can result in low systems performance. SAI comprises
540 octets of authentication data (the second-largest of all the messages). At the same time, the
capacity and number of physical links are limited (e.g., 384kbps, 16 links in rural area). Thus, a
heavy volume of SAI can create severe traffic congestion in the network. When adding new
security features, network engineers must consider the impact of network traffic in order to avoid
network congestion.
* Security traffic comprises 17.2% of all the network traffic in HLR.
* The message length of the SAI is the second longest.
4 Security messages can cause severe network traffic congestion.
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Traffic Ratio in Yokohama 6/12/2002 8:00
PRN
1.72% [ *PRN
lr t"_ lr-~
O ISD
O SRI
* SRG
* SRS
EI SAI
SRI UL
2.73%
Li.J."i22L SRG
SRS 10.48%
0.75%
Traffic Ratio in Yokohama 6/12/2002 18:00
PRN r _
59% *PRN4.59%
O ISD
]O SRI
*SRG
[ SRS
SAI
SRI
l UL7.49% _..
SRSSRS SRG
0.99% 13.04%
13.04%
Source: Author, 2005.
Figure 4-16: Network Traffic in DoCoMo's 3G Systems
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4.3.3 CPU Usage
The number of dynamic steps and the traffic model help to clarify the relationship between
dynamic steps and CPU usage. The CPU requires a certain amount of dynamic steps in order to
execute the process. If the quantitative relation between these two parameters can be determined,
we can evaluate the impact of new features added to the existing platform.
Integrating data from Figure 4-15 with Table 4-4, we can estimate the required number of
dynamic steps to complete 100 messages (see Table 4-5). The graph of CPU usage is quite linear
(see Figure 4-17). According to the graph, CPU usage increases 9.6%, 9.2% and 8.0% (per 100
transactions) in the first, second and third version respectively. Thus, the relationship between
dynamic steps and CPU usage can be derived as follows.
* The first version: 7,387,116 steps (100 messages): 9.6% up+ 1.29956E-06 %up/step
* The second version: 7,201,126 steps (100 messages): 9.2% up 1.27758E-06 %up/step
* The third version: 5,797,529 steps (100 messages): 8.0% up4l.3799E-06/oup/step
Average: 1..31901E-06%up/step (7,581 steps added+1% up/100TPS)
Table 4-5: Network Traffic Model and Dynamic Steps
Traffic/100 Traffic * Dynamic Steps
Messages 1st Version 2nd Version 3rd Version
3,602,024- 2t1460 ~,99-. 1,669064I SAl-SA ack. .:28.8%) (29.8) 88
2 UL-ISD 30.9 1,704,259 890,013 955,892
3 ISD ack-UL ack 30.9 1,150,129 3,412,274 2,474,409
4 SRI-PRN 6.1 350,012 241,298 275,324
5 PRN ack-SRI ack 3.0 104,724 68,637 79,236
6 SRG-SRG ack 9.1 291,082 150,830 134,341
7 SRS-SRS ack 2.8 184,887 291,081 209,264
All Total 100 7,387,116 7,201,126 5,797,529
UL: Update location, ISD: Insert Subscriber Data, SAI: Send Authentication Info, SRI: Send
Routing Info, PRN: Provide Roaming Number, SRG: Send Routing Info for GPRS, SRS: Send
Routing Info for SM
Source: Author, 2005.
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200 TPS 400 TPS 6 TI'S800 TPS
1st version 32.8% 52.3% 70.7 87.6%
2nd version 31.2% 49.8% .7% 85.0%
3rd version 30.7% 46.8% 6 77.2%
4th version 30.9% 46.9% 6 77.5%
5th version 31.0% 47.9% - . 80.3%
6th version 31.3% 48.1% 64.3% 80.5%
Source: Author, 2005.
Figure 4-17: CPU Usage of DoCoMo's 3G Systems
Compared with the number of dynamic steps in current functions (e.g., authentication =
143,861 steps), the number of acceptable dynamic steps is quite small (7,581 steps). The first two
versions had improper memory usage in their security functions, so CPU usage exceeded system
requirements (600 TPS within 70% CPU usage). When implementing the third version, DoCoMo
applied the platform extension to improve the unnecessary functions. This approach helped
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enhance software performance, and CPU usage dropped from 67.7% to 62% (600 TPS).
However, after the improvement, no significant platform innovations have been applied to the
network software. New mobile services force CPU usage to increase little by little. If CPU usage
increases even 1% (600 TPS) in each version,4 3 the platform will be able to accept only six more
versions (through 2006). In particular, the security functions already occupy 28.8% to 48.8% of
the total number of dynamic steps. The number of 3G subscribers is also increasing. This result
indicates that DoCoMo's platform has almost reached its limits. It is quite challenging to
implement new security features without platform innovation (platform renewal).
* The relationship between dynamic steps and CPU usage can be determined
(7,581 steps added1l% increase in CPU usage/IOOTPS)
* DoCoMo's platform will reach the limits of its systems performance around 2006.
* When DoCoMo implements new security features, platform renewal will be crucial.
43. This situation means that increase in 1264 steps/100TPS is acceptable (7581steps/6
=1264).
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5 Securing Against Fraud in Mobile Communications
Since October 2001, mobile carriers have been deploying 3G mobile systems. Today, 61
UMTS commercial services operate worldwide, and more than 33 million subscribers enjoy 3G
services.44 With a global roaming service, 3G networks are becoming more interconnected with
other 2G and 3G networks. In the near future, seamless interoperability among mobile networks
is expected to be achieved. Network access and authentication requests will be generated both
inside and outside the network. Therefore, securing their own mobile systems against
unauthorized access will become even more essential.
To date, no cloned mobile handset or fraudulent communications have been found in 3G
mobile systems. However, the lessons learned from the existing network software (DoCoMo)
suggest that the security mechanisms implemented today are imperfect and vulnerable. In
particular, replay attacks seeking to obtain network authentication can break security codes and
allow fraudulent communications.
To a greater or lesser extent, other mobile carriers have similar problems.4 5 Based on the
lessons learned from the existing software in 3G mobile systems, this chapter will suggest how
mobile carriers can avoid potential fraudulent communications and secure their mobile systems.
5.1 Learning from DoCoMo's Network Software Development
DoCoMo's case offers important lessons: (1) implemented security features are vulnerable
to fraudulent communications, (2) various pressures, such as requirements for a shorter lead time,
cost reduction, and high reliability, prevent sufficient implementation of the security features and
44. UMTS Forum, as of August 2005
45. Interviews with several network engineers in other 3G systems suggest similar security
problems. However, specific information cannot be given for security reasons.
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skew the platform architecture, and (3) the platform has its limits and platform renewal should be
applied in order to break through the old constraints.
First, a clear gap exists between global standards and actual implementation. Several
critical security features, such as SQN management and AMF, are sometimes missing in the
platform. In particular, replay attacks can break security codes and allow fraudulent
communications. Removing the possibility of fraudulent communications requires fixing the
platform architecture for authentication mechanisms. In order to avoid the large-scale failure
caused by software defects, highly sensitive tests are required. Furthermore, upgrading network
software and renewing USIM cards (over 17 million cards) are also necessary, which is neither
easy nor cheap. Indeed, mobile carriers will not choose this option until fraud becomes a major
problem in their networks.
Second, in order to meet delivery schedules and reduce development costs, mobile carriers
tend to reduce the required functions. When developing network software, network engineers are
forced to concentrate on optimizing the current software and tend to overlook extensibility for
the next version. The lack of long-term platform thinking results in complex and inflexible
platform architecture. In such a complex architecture, the current operating platform is
considered more reliable than a new one. In fact, fundamental change may trigger hidden failures
and cause serious consequences in the telecommunications systems. Once the original platform
is implemented, architectural change becomes quite difficult due to organizational resistance. In
fact, in 2001-2002, DoCoMo discussed architectural changes in its operating platform, but
DoCoMo concluded it was too risky to apply such architectural changes. This kind of
organizational resistance and inertia regarding platform modifications remains a key challenge.
Third, DoCoMo's case suggests that platform extension cannot be a fundamental solution
for resolving platform performance problems. Security-related traffic presents 17.2%, and
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security features take up nearly 30% of the CPU performance. If we assume that (1) the number
of 3G subscribers is growing, and (2) that new user-oriented application services will require
more network authentication procedures, platform renewal will be inevitable in order to satisfy
the required performance targets. To improve performance, network engineers can apply a
platform extension strategy by configuring the network software and reducing unnecessary
procedures. However, this method can be effective only once. In DoCoMo's case, after the third
version of network software, no significant improvements in performance have been achieved.
DoCoMo's case also indicates that the extensibility of the platform can be measured by
estimating the number of dynamic steps. Before reaching performance limits, mobile carriers can
take appropriate measures to avoid system failure.
* A clear gap exists between global standards and actual implementation.
* Various pressures (e.g., short lead time, cost reduction) prevent sufficient
implementation of the security features and skew the platform architecture.
* Platform change is difficult owing to organizational resistance and/or inertia.
* The platform has its limits, and platform renewal should be applied in order to break the
constraints.
5.2 Strategies for Securing Mobile Systems
As discussed in Chapter 2.5, securing mobile systems sufficiently remains a challenging
issue. However, mobile carriers can reduce potential risks by understanding current platform
conditions and addressing architectural and implementation problems. Based on the platform
thinking, Figure 5-2 and Figure 5-3 show basic strategies to secure mobile systems4 6. Substantial
differences exist before and after deployment of services, so the classification is below:
* Before deployment: Software development phase based on a waterfall model
· After deployment: Implementation level and platform architecture (see Figure 5-1)
46. More research is needed to support implementation strategies (e.g., research on
Vodafone's case).
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Implementation Levels (Security Features)
Platform
Architecture
Flexible,
modularized
Inflexible,
not modularized
Sufficient
Well-secured
in the long term
Well-secured
in the short term
Insufficient,
not so critical
Secured in the
long term
Secured in the
short term
Critical
Vulnerable in the
short term
Vulnerable in the
long term
Source: Author, 2005.
Figure 5-1: Classification of Security Levels
Source: Author, 2005.
Figure 5-2: Basic Strategies to Secure Mobile Systems (Before Release)
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Figure 5-3: Basic Strategies to Secure Mobile Systems (After Release)
5.2.1 Before Deployment
Design Phase
The design phase directs the future platform architecture. If network engineers focus only
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on satisfying current requirements and overlook the flexibility and extensibility of the future
platform, the platform will lose its potential capabilities. Better designs will require substantially
less rework and redesign [71]. In this sense, the design phase is the most important phase in
software development.
Before coding the software program, mobile carriers should clarify the desired architecture
on the basis of long-term platform thinking. In order to avoid unnecessary defects and improve
productivity, more complete specifications should exist prior to coding phase [72]. In the design
phase, mobile carriers should specify interfaces among subsystems (functional elements) and try
to achieve a modular architecture. Many unnecessary subsystems and redundant interfaces
should be revised or eliminated to reduce complexity and improve extensibility (see Figure 5-4).
When DoCoMo developed its network software, global standards were not fixed and user
requirements often changed, making it very challenging to design the entire systems effectively.
Today, technical specifications and user requirements are virtually fixed, and mobile carriers
planning to deploy 3G systems can design the platform architecture accurately and effectively.
Developing network software on schedule with the lowest possible costs is important, but
mobile carriers should not focus on this requirement to the exclusion of other important
requirements. Organizational resistance after the software release may not allow mobile carriers
to achieve architectural changes in the network software. Thus, a certain amount of time and cost
is necessary in order to satisfy sufficient security levels. DoCoMo's case suggests that security
features require an enormous volume of CPU performance. A flexible and extensible platform
can survive when new services are implemented and the platform confronts the "expansion
phase" (see Figure 5-5).
· A desired architectural design based on long-term platform thinking must be clarified.
-System architecture should be less complex
· Flexibility and extensibility should be considered in the platform.
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* Enough time and cost are required to achieve sufficient security.
* A well-designed platform can survive during the expansion phase.
Complexity
6000-8000
2500-3000
300-500
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I No platform thinking
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I
platform
ned platform)
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Note: Complexity is based on the number of interfaces among modules (subsystems)
Source: Author, 2005.
Figure 5-4: Long-Term Platform Thinking and Complexity of the System
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Source: Author, 2005.
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Figure 5-5: Phases of Platform Innovation
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Coding Phase
In the coding phase mobile carriers should focus on modularizing the functions and
accumulating development knowledge (e.g., coding and debugging knowledge). Security
features comprise fundamental functions in the platform and require extremely sophisticated
expertise. Modularization helps create the highly complex software and localize the
modifications. Well-designed modules can be used to create similar functions in the next version.
For example, if mobile carriers develop well-modularized UMTS security functions, these
carriers can apply the modules to create GSM security functions as well.
Software development knowledge (information development [73]) will also be
accumulated in this phase. Mobile carriers should list up coding and debugging know-how and
utilize this knowledge in future development. Specific hardware characteristics often restrict
software development. In DoCoMo's case, the NEC OS and Fujitsu OS have different coding
requirements; the same coding and configuration do not work in different machines. Thus,
accumulated knowledge should continue to be accessible through succeeding software
development in order to avoid mistakes found in previous versions. This knowledge will allow
new network engineers working on succeeding versions to understand the coding methods and
improve the platform.
* Mobile carriers should focus on modularization and accumulation of development
knowledge.
· Accumulated knowledge should be accessible to succeeding software versions.
Testing Phase
During the testing phase, mobile carriers should focus on collecting data that identify the
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specific factors underlying and contributing to the problems. Defect analysis47 and retesting
(regression test) are crucial to ensure that the software quality levels are reached [74]. The
ultimate goal of testing phase is to achieve the perfection (zero defects48) of the software.
Testing of security features is quite challenging because data length is very long and the
data itself changes randomly for encryption. Thus, simple data, such as "0000" and "FFFF" is
often applied to test security functions. In DoCoMo's case, the company often temporarily
suspended the security functions in order to reduce complexity for testing.
If mobile carriers simplify the testing too much, it becomes difficult to justify the security
features between mobile handsets and HLR/AuC. A wide variety of testing for security features
should be necessary to guarantee the functions. At the same time, mobile carriers should
establish automated testing systems, including mobile handsets or HLR/AuC simulators, to
effectively test the security features. Sometimes an automated test adds considerable complexity
and requires more efforts from the test team, but it can also provide valuable assistance for
justifying security features in the right environment. In succeeding versions, test results can be
used to confirm the utility and reliability of new functions in a new platform.
* Mobile carriers should test various patterns of security features to justify authentication
mechanisms.
* Automated testing allows various testing patterns and helps confirm security features.
* Accumulated successful test data can confirm the new functions of succeeding
platforms.
Release Phase
Not all of the security features may be implemented in the original version of the software.
47. Defect analysis includes the followings: defect tracking information, defect type, phase
where the defect is injected and removed, and time required to fix the defect.
48. Unexpected software defects are not included.
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However, mobile carriers need to understand what is possible and impossible after the
deployment. For example, modifications related to mobile handsets (USIM) and network
systems are quite challenging (e.g., changes in security algorithms and implementation of SQN
management). Mobile carriers must clarify the differences (see Table 4-1) and evaluate potential
risks, such as eavesdropping, masquerading, unauthorized network access, and manipulation of
messages.
Substantial differences exist prior to and following deployment of services. Strict and
sufficient field tests are crucial to ensure reliability, functionality, and performance. Unexpected
problems associated with critical security features should be recognized and measures should be
taken to minimize negative impacts before final release. In order to improve software quality and
platform architecture, reschedule of a commercial release is acceptable. In addition, DoCoMo's
case shows that security traffic consists largely of network traffic, and security features require
high CPU performance. Mobile carriers should precisely evaluate the systems performance
before deployment.
* Complexity in the platform should be reduced.
4Rescheduling of a final release is acceptable.
* Original version does not have to acquire full security features, but mobile carriers
should clarify the differences between specifications and implementation.
* Strict field testing is crucial to confirm security functions.
* Mobile carriers should evaluate the tradeoffs between security and performance.
5.2.2 After Deployment
Well-Secured Platform (Long/Short Term)
Sufficient security features that cover the full specifications of global standards will enable
mobile carriers to focus on possible unauthorized access by intruders using other 2G or 3G
networks. Compared with the security levels of other 2G and 3G networks, this network can be
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considered more secure. The risks of fraudulent network access are more likely from outside
their own network. Mobile carriers can identify future threats that may not have been anticipated
in the global specifications. This experience will help develop new security features in the global
standards.
At the same time, sufficient security features require high CPU performance and database
resources. Mobile carriers must evaluate the extensibility of the platform and resolve tradeoffs
between security and performance. If the current platform lacks flexibility and modularity,
mobile carriers should improve the platform architecture to satisfy future demands. Given the
fully implemented security features, platform extension is desirable to avoid implementation
risks.
* Risk assessment should focus on network traffic from other networks.
* Mobile carriers can address future threats.
* Platform extension is desirable when mobile carriers add some security features.
Secured Platform (Long/ Short Term)
Mobile carriers often simplify their security features in order to reduce costs and
complexity. If a missing feature is not critical (e.g., if the platform supports only fixed-length
parameters) and platform architecture is well designed, the existing platform will remain viable.
As discussed earlier, security comprises a fundamental part of the platform. The risks involved in
changing the platform sometimes exceed the benefits gained by adding or fixing security features.
Thus, the criteria should be whether the system can detect and prevent replay attacks, whether
eavesdropping allows intruders to identify the message protocol, and whether the system is
flexible enough to upgrade the security features.
An analysis of network traffic is also necessary. Mobile carriers have to collect the
network data from inside and outside of the network and check possible unauthorized access.
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Mobile carriers also can ask a third party to objectively evaluate the security levels. At the same
time, mobile carriers need to foster a tolerant culture for architectural change in the network
software. It is essential to educate network engineers that architectural change in the platform
does not imply fault on the part of the engineers.
* The current platform remains viable if missing security features are not critical.
* Evaluation criteria must be clear and objective.
* A tolerant culture should be fostered to facilitate necessary architectural changes.
* An analysis of network traffic (inside and outside the network) is required.
Vulnerable Platform (Short Term)
If the current platform lacks critical security features but the existing platform is
modularized and flexible, mobile carriers should fix or add the missing security mechanisms.
Given the implementation risks, platform extension is reasonable to fix security problems. At this
point, however, implementation of new application services, such as multi-calling and
videoconferencing, is not recommended. These new services require complex architecture and it
becomes difficult to identify any defects associated with security features. This platform
extension should focus only on upgrading security features, which means that mobile carriers
sometimes have to delay the launch of new services in order to fix the security problems. Given
today's severe market competition, this decision might be hard to accept. However, mobile
carriers need to understand that an unsecured system ultimately will cost far more than any
benefits gained from new services.
At the same time, mobile carriers should investigate why current situation happened. In
DoCoMo's case, the 10-15% cost reduction rule, too-short lead time, and the requirement for
extremely high reliability removed the incentives for architectural changes based on long-term
platform thinking and resulted in skewed platform architecture. Consequently, authentication
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mechanisms were insufficiently implemented. Some reasons are understandable, but others are
not. Mobile carriers must evaluate these findings and fix the fundamental problems.
* Platform extension for upgrading security features should occur separately from normal
implementation of new application services.
* Mobile carriers should accept the delay in offering new services until updated security
features are stabilized (2 to 6 months).
* Mobile carriers should determine why the existing platform is insufficient.
4Problems should be fixed before applying platform extension.
Vulnerable Platform (Long Term)
If the existing platform lacks critical security features and flexibility, mobile carriers have
to rely on peripheral security mechanisms, such as traffic analysis, data trace, and protocol
analysis. For example, if HLR receives an "Authentication Failure Report" from VLR/SGSN, the
HLR can alert network operators who can identify useful specific information, such as telephone
number (MSISDN), identification number (IMSI), time, and location. These operators can
systematically trace the calls associated with this subscriber and analyze the message protocols.
To be effective, a good system must be simple, accurate, and easy to use [75]. Utilization of
fraud detection mechanisms (risk control) allows early detection of fraudulent communications.
Mobile carries also should listen to the end users and concentrate on software quality from the
customer perspectives [76] because unexpected threats are often implied in end-user claims.
However, this strategy is not a long-term solution. This platform will remain vulnerable.
Replay attacks may decipher encrypted security messages and allow intruders to access the
network. In addition, this platform cannot survive if the required performance rises. At present,
the required performance is at Level "A" in Figure 5-6. As the number of 3G subscribers
increases and new services are added, the required performance will rise to Level "B" or "C".
The platform extension approach in an inflexible platform cannot provide sufficient performance
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for the future. In order to fix this fundamental problem, platform renewal is essential. However,
platform renewal often results in substantial migration risks and organizational resistance to
architectural change. As a first step toward platform renewal, mobile carriers should clarify the
boundaries inside or outside of the subsystems (see Figure 5-7).
Given organizational resistance based on cultural and political reasons, platform renewal
cannot be achieved without top-down decision making. Early decision making is better for
platform renewal because it takes at least two years to accomplish such renewal. Before the
required performance changes from Level "A" to "B" in Figure 5-6, mobile carriers have to (1)
evaluate the capability of the platform (e.g., performance based on dynamic steps), and (2)
forecast performance requirements for the future. Top executives also must stress that a
statement such as "no fraudulent communications have been found so far" does not mean that the
system is secured. Several years may be needed to reorient the mindset of network engineers and
fulfill the platform renewal. However, this step is vital before mobile carriers encounter a wider
range of fraudulent communications.
* Peripheral security mechanisms allow mobile carriers to detect fraudulent
communications.
4The detection mechanisms should be systematic.
* Claims from end users can help identify fraudulent communications.
* Platform renewal is essential as part of long-term strategy.
* Before platform renewal is undertaken, mobile carriers should clarify the boundaries of
the subsystems.
* A top-down approach is required to mitigate organizational resistance and apply
platform renewal.
* Early decision making is essential before required performance exceeds the maximum
performance capability of the platform.
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Figure 5-6: Platform and Required Performance
Source: Author, ZUU.
Figure 5-7: Clarify the Boundaries Inside or Outside of the Subsystems
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6 Conclusion
Fraudulent communications are not new. Ever since the inception of the first generation
mobile systems, mobile carriers have strived to prevent fraudulent communications. Using
digital ciphering mechanisms, GSM systems have contributed to preventing fraudulent
communications. However, some of the security mechanisms in GSM already have become
insufficient and outdated. Given the fraudulent communications found in GSM networks, more
advanced security mechanisms are required in 3G mobile systems. Security algorithms have
become more sophisticated, and new and longer security parameters have been applied. New
security operations have also been implemented to detect potentially fraudulent communications.
6.1 Security in 3G Mobile Systems
Network security ensures the consistency, integrity, and reliability of telecommunications
systems, and authorized network access can prevent fraudulent communications and maintain the
availability of each system. Currently, however, none of the 3G mobile systems is perfectly
secured, for the following reasons.
1) For performance reasons, 3G mobile systems must rely on conventional security
methods, which allow mobile carriers to reduce network delays but also make the
system less secure.
2) Both secured and unsecured networks are interconnected by global roaming services.
Fraudulent network access can be generated from outside networks that support weaker
security mechanisms. 4 9
49. For example, China and some countries turn off encryption due to export restriction
reasons.
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3) As a practical matter, it is difficult to upgrade security features to protect against
brand-new and unexpected network attacks that may not have been anticipated in the
global specifications.
In addition, the 3G technical specifications, including network architecture, network
protocols, and security algorithms, are widely available to the public. 3GPP also provides sample
source codes and simulation data for security algorithms. Open-design architecture helps create
better security standards, but at the same time today's sophisticated intruders can defeat
telecommunication networks by applying the knowledge of 3G specifications. Thus, an
inadequate system design will make mobile systems highly vulnerable to unauthorized access to
mobile communications.
6.2 Lessons Learned in Actual 3G Mobile Systems
To date, no cloned mobile handsets and no fraudulent communications have been found in
3G mobile systems. However, the lessons learned from the existing network software (DoCoMo)
suggest that the security mechanisms implemented today are imperfect and vulnerable. In
particular, replay attacks to obtain network authentication can break security codes and allow
fraudulent communications. DoCoMo's case provides us three important lessons:
1) Critical security features are sometimes missing in implementation (a clear gap exists
between global standards and actual implementation).
2) Limited development time, cost reduction pressure and requirement for high reliability
have forced mobile carriers to implement the insufficient and inflexible authentication
mechanisms and skew the platform architecture.
3) Platform architecture has its limits. However, mobile carriers can take appropriate
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measure by evaluating the extensibility of the platform. In order to satisfy performance
requirements platform renewal should be applied.
6.3 Strategies for Mobile Carriers
Telecommunication is a basic, necessary service for individuals and corporations. Thus,
security features must perform correctly on network software to protect against frauds. Even a
single security breach can result in costly economic damage and serious failure in the critical
infrastructure.
Prevention of such security threats remains a challenging issue. However, mobile carriers
can reduce potential risks by understanding current platform conditions and addressing
architectural problems beforehand.
Before Deployment
Substantial differences exist before and after deployment of the services. Mobile carriers
must remember that architectural change is far more difficult to accomplish after launching the
original platform.
Before deployment, mobile carriers should clarify the desired architectural design based on
long-term platform thinking. The design phase has a direct impact on the future platform
architecture. In this sense, the design phase is the most important phase. Not all of the security
features may be implemented in the original version. However, mobile carriers have to
understand what is possible and impossible after deployment.
Some security features require significant modifications in both mobile handsets and core
network (HLR/AuC and VLR/SGSN). Upgrading the network software and renewing the USIM
cards will be necessary. This upgrading is not easy because mobile handsets and core network
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systems are widely distributed. Serious efforts and several years will be necessary to resolve this
situation. Until such problems are fixed, mobile carriers will have to accept some security holes
in the network.
Mobile carriers also should evaluate whether the platform can survive during the system
expansion phase. Modularization is essential to increase the flexibility and extensibility of the
platform. Well-defined modularization helps localize implementation risks and increase systems
reliability.
Before launching a system, mobile carriers should conduct strict field tests to ensure the
reliability, functionality, and performance of security features. In order to improve software
quality and the platform architecture, it is acceptable to reschedule a commercial release. After
deployment, mobile carriers should take action to secure their own networks based on
implemented levels of security and platform conditions.
After Deployment
Ideally, security features should be well designed and implemented, but as a practical
matter, this situation is hard for mobile carriers to achieve. The security mechanisms
implemented today tend to be imperfect and vulnerable. Based on platform conditions, four basic
strategies can be categorized for securing mobile systems: (1) well-secured, (2) secured, (3)
vulnerable (short term), and (4) vulnerable (long term).
First, in a well-secured platform, mobile carriers must focus on risk assessment. Compared
with the security levels of other 2G and 3G networks, this network is more secure. Mobile
carriers should analyze future threats coming from other 2G or 3G networks. This risk
assessment will help develop new security features to meet global standards. At the same time,
sufficient security features require high CPU performance and database resources. Evaluation of
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the tradeoffs between security and performance is necessary. With fully implemented security
features, platform extension is desirable to avoid implementation risks.
Second, if missing security features are not especially critical, the current platform can be
considered secure and will remain viable. Mobile carriers can ask a third party to objectively
evaluate the security levels. The criteria must be: (1) the system can detect and prevent replay
attacks, (2) messages cannot be identified through eavesdropping on traffic data, and (3) the
system is flexible enough to upgrade its security features. Sometimes architectural innovation is
necessary to achieve better security features. Therefore, mobile carriers should foster a tolerant
culture for architectural change in the network software.
Third, even if the current platform is vulnerable, a modularized and flexible platform
allows mobile carriers to fix or add the missing critical security features. In order to reduce
implementation risks, platform extension should focus only on upgrading security features,
otherwise the upgrade becomes complex, and it will be hard to identify the defects associated
with security features. Today's severe market competition often prevents top executives from
making this painful decision. However, mobile carriers need to understand that an unsecured
system ultimately will cost far more than any benefits gained from new services.
Finally, if the existing platform lacks critical security features and flexibility, mobile
carriers must rely on peripheral security mechanisms to secure the systems. Such fraud detection
mechanisms should be systematic, and include traffic analysis, data trace, and protocol analysis
to identify potential fraud. However, this strategy cannot be a long-term solution. The current
platform will remain vulnerable. Replay attacks can decipher encrypted security messages and
allow intruders to access the network. Furthermore, performance requirements may exceed the
maximum performance capabilities of the platform owing to an increased number of subscribers
and/or the deployment of new services. Platform renewal becomes essential as part of the
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long-term strategy. However, such renewal may cause substantial migration risks and encounter
organizational resistance. Thus, early decision making by top management (using a top-down
approach) is crucial. At the same time, mobile carriers should foster a tolerant culture for
architectural changes in network software. Such a culture of tolerance will facilitate the
necessary architectural changes. Even so, platform renewal will likely take at least two years to
accomplish, but these steps are essential before mobile carriers encounter further serious and
wide-ranging fraudulent communications
In the near future, communications systems such as wired or wireless networks, satellite
systems, and the Internet will converge via TCP/IP. The boundaries among networks will
diminish, and this convergence will allow many people to access these networks. New
technology developments and telecommunications convergence will represent a major challenge
to the UMTS security architecture.
Four years have passed since the first 3G mobile system was deployed. To date, no
fraudulent communications have been found in 3G mobile networks. At the same time, however,
no perfectly secured system exists in 3G mobile networks. History repeats itself. Just as mobile
carriers experienced fraudulent communications in the first generation and the second generation
networks, it is likely to confront similar situations in 3G mobile networks.
Telecommunication is an essential service in human life, and network security supports the
fundamental features of telecommunications services. By addressing architectural and
implementation problems beforehand, mobile carriers can manage unexpected security problems
in the next generation networks and secure the systems against fraud in mobile communications.
END
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Appendix
Abbreviations and Terminologies
1G:
2G:
3G:
3GPP:
3GPP2:
4G:
5G:
AMPS:
AuC:
bps:
CDMA:
CN:
DB:
EDGE:
EV-DO:
EV-DV:
FDMA:
FOMA:
GGSN:
GMSC:
GPRS:
GSM:
GSM-MAP:
HLR:
HSDPA:
IMT-2000:
IP:
IS-95:
ISDN:
ISUP:
ITU:
the First generation mobile technologies
the second generation mobile technologies
the third generation mobile technologies
The Third Generation Partnership Project (UMTS Network)
The Third Generation Partnership Project 2 (CDMA2000 Network)
the Forth generation mobile technologies
the Fifth generation mobile technologies
Advanced Mobile Phone System
Authentication Center
bits per second
Code Division Multiple Access
Core Network
Database
Enhanced Data GSM Environment
Evolution Data Only
Evolution Data Voice
Frequency Division Multiple Access
Freedom Of Mobile multimedia Access
Gateway GPRS Support Node
Gateway Mobile Switching Center
General Packet Radio Service
Global System for Mobile Communications
Global System for Mobile Communications-Mobile Application Part
Home Location Register
High Speed Downlink Packet Access
International Mobile Telecommunications 2000
Internet Protocol (IPv4: IP version 4 and IPv6: IP version 6)
Interim Standard 95
Integrated Services Digital Network
Integrated Services Digital Network User Part
International Telecommunication Union
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ITU-T:
Kbps:
MAP:
MAPsec:
MC-CDMA:
MS:
MSC:
O&M:
OFDM:
PDC:
PDC-P:
PLMN:
PSTN:
QoS:
RNC:
SCCP:
SCP:
SGSN:
TACS:
TC:
TDMA:
UMTS:
VLR:
VoIP:
W-CDMA:
The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector
Kilobits per second
Mobile Application Part
Mobile Application Part security
MultiCarrier-Code Division Multiple Access
Mobile Station
Mobile services Switching Center
Operation and Maintenance
Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing
Personal Digital Cellular
Personal Digital Cellular Packet
Public Land Mobile Network
Public Switched Telephone Network
Quality of Service
Radio Network Controller
Signaling Connection Control Part
Service Control Point
Serving GPRS Support Node
Total Access Communication System
Transaction Capabilities
Time Division Multiple Access
Universal Mobile Telecommunications System
Visitor Location Register
Voice over IP
Wideband CDMA
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